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Patent Infringement Damages in Japan and the United
States: Will Increased Patent Infringement Damage
Awards Revive the Japanese Economy?
Toshiko Takenaka, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
Since the Japanese economy plunged into its current, deep
recession, the Japanese government has been looking for measures to
revive its economy. Reviewing United States legislation in the 1980s
and early 1990s, Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) and its agency, the Japanese Patent Office (JPO), were
convinced that the pro-patent policy and other legislation that
encouraged technology transfer were the primary reasons for the
United States’ recovery from its recession.1 To follow the United
States example, the government organized the Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights in the Twenty-First Century. In its report,
published in April 1997, the Commission emphasized the need to
strengthen intellectual property rights in order to promote the
development of breakthrough technologies.2
Since then, MITI and the JPO have changed their intellectual
property policies in order to make them more IP owner-friendly.
Japanese patent law traditionally gave more weight to public
interests, particularly competitors’ rights to design around existing
patents, than to patent owners’ interests. The Commission on
* Director, Center for Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual Property. Assistant
Professor, University of Washington School of Law.
1. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHT COMMITTEE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, TOKKYO HOU
TOU NO KAISEI NI KANSURU TOUSHIN [INVITATION OF COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL FOR
REVISING PATENT LAW AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS] 10 (1997).
2. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,
TOWARD THE ERA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CREATION: CHALLENGES FOR
BREAKTHROUGH (1997) (Japan) [hereinafter 1997 COMMISSION REPORT] (last modified Apr. 7,
1997) <http://www.jpo-miti.go.jp>.
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Intellectual Property Right proposed to shift this traditional balance
between the two competing interests toward more protection of
patent owners’ interests, and wants patent law to give more
incentives for developing pioneer inventions rather than
improvements and manufacturing technologies.3 This new policy is
not only in response to criticisms by United States patent owners, but
if also reflects the needs of domestic industries facing competition
from Asia.4
To increase incentives for innovation, the JPO emphasizes the
need to give quick and strong patent protection.5 To meet this need,
the JPO reconsidered the time period allowed to request examination
and opposition or invalidation proceedings, and revised the patent
statute to shorten the time required for examining applications.6 With
respect to the policy of giving strong patent protection, the JPO
organized a committee to review claim interpretation and encouraged
debates among patent professionals on the appropriateness of the
scope of protection given by Japanese courts.7 Responding to
concerns expressed by patent professionals, recent decisions by lower
courts have broadly interpreted claims and adopted the doctrine of
equivalents.8 The Japanese Supreme Court recently endorsed these
lower court decisions.9
3. 1997 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
4. INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CHITEKI ZAISAN SHINNGAI NI TAISURU
SONNGAI BAISHOU BASSOKU NO ARIKATANI KANNSURU CHOUSA HOUKOKUSHO [REPORT OF
STUDY ON THE APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES AND CRIMINAL SANCTION
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT] 81 (1998). A survey indicates that fifty
percent of the industry believes that the current damages awarded by Japanese courts are
insufficient and the other fifty percent believes the current damages are sufficient. The Second
Subcommittee, the First Group, Patent Committee, Songai Baishou Seido no Genjou [Study of
Remedies for Patent Infringement in Japan] 49 CHIZAI KANRI 879 (1999).
5. Id. at 21.
6. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 41 of 1999.
7. See INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, REPORT OF STUDIES ON ISSUES
CONCERNING CLAIM INTERPRETATION IN JAPAN AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES II (1999). The JPO
has contracted with the Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP) to investigate, research, and report
on legislation and case law from the United States and European countries.
8. Genentech Inc. v. Sumitomo Seiyaku K.K., 1586 HANREI JIHÇ 117 (Osaka KÇtÇ
Saibansho 1996). An English translation and commentary on the case is reported in Toshiko
Takenaka, New Policy in Interpreting Japanese Patents: Osaka High Court Affirming
Infringement of Genentech’s t-PA patents under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 3-2 CASRIP
NEWSL. 3 (1996) available at <www.law.washington.edu/~casrip/newsletter/newsv3i2jp.html>.
9. Tsubakimoto Seiko v. T.H.K., 1630 HANREI JIHÇ 32 (SaikÇ Saibansho 1998). An
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/11
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After finishing its review of the patent-granting procedure and the
liability phase of the patent enforcement procedure, the JPO entered
the final stage of its review of the Japanese patent system in light of
its new pro-patent policy. This final stage was a review of patentees’
remedies for patent infringement and culminated, in late 1998, with a
revision of the patent law provisions relating to calculation of
damages,10 and in 1999, with a revision of the patent enforcement
proceeding.11 This legislation is intended to increase damages
awarded by Japanese courts, which have been criticized by United
States patent owners for their much smaller damage awards than
those awarded by United States courts.12 The JPO’s attempt to
increase damages was successful because courts reacted very quickly
and started to award larger damages more frequently. However,
whether such increased damages attain the goal of providing
incentive for research and innovation is questionable.
Accordingly, this Article will look at the impact of the new
Japanese legislation on patent infringement damages and will discuss
whether the increase in damage awards contributes to the creation of
breakthrough technology. To understand this impact, Part I will
discuss pre-1998 legislation damages and highlight the difference
between damages awarded by United States courts and those awarded
by Japanese courts, by comparing United States and Japanese case
examples. In examining the general tort and patent law theories, Part
I will also try to identify the source of the difference and discuss how
this difference is reflected in current United States and Japanese case
law. Part II of this Article will focus on a recent Japanese case, that
indicates a new direction on the calculation of damages and will
examine reasons for the change. Finally, Part III of this paper will
examine to what extent the new legislation will change the scope of
English translation of the decision by the author is published in The Supreme Court Affirmed
the Presence of the Doctrine of Equivalents Under Japanese Patent System, 5-1 CASRIP
NEWSL. 12 (1998) available at <http://www.law.washington.edu/~casrip/newsletter/
newsv5i1jp.html>.
10. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1998, art. 102, para. 1.
11. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 41 of 1999, art. 105.
12. Scott K. Dinwiddie, Note, A Shifting Barrier? Difficulties of Obtaining Patent
Infringement Damages in Japan, 70 WASH. L. REV. 833 (1995); William C. Revelos, Note,
Patent Enforcement Difficulties in Japan: Are There Any Satisfactory Solutions for the United
States?, 29 GW J. INT’L L. & ECON. (1995).
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patent infringement damages and will discuss whether the increase in
patent infringement damages will contribute to the recovery of
Japanese economy.
I. PRE-1998 LAW
A. Two Cases Illustrating the Difference in Patent Damages
A comparison of two cases involving similar facts and claims
would best highlight the difference between damages awarded by
Japanese and United States courts. However, it is impossible to find
similar cases because the case law in each jurisdiction is vastly
different and thus parties adopt different strategies and present
different claims. Accordingly, this Article selects two cases that
represent the respective courts’ typical attitude toward awarding
damages and emphasizes the difference between them by discussing
how the other court would have resolved the same issues.
1. Japanese Example: The Golf Cart Monorail System Case
The reluctance of Japanese courts to give damages in the form of
lost profits and keep damage awards to the minimum is well
represented in Hankou Kousan K.K. v. Monoreru Kougyou K.K.13 In
this case, the Osaka District Court denied claims of lost profits and
significantly reduced the amount of royalty claimed by the patentee.
The utility model in the suit related to a monorail system installed in
golf courses for carrying golf carts. Hankou Kousan sued the
defendant who manufactured and sold similar monorail systems using
two different types of rails along which golf carts move.
The defendant sold two types of monorails systems.14 The first
type used only an above-ground rail that was installed on columns
protruding from the ground. The second type combined the above-
ground rail with an underground rail that was installed within a U-
shaped groove in the ground. The utility model registrant joined with
13. Hankon Kousan K.K. v. Monoreru Kougyow K.K., 1078 HANREI JIHÇ 117 (Osaka
ChihÇ Saibansho 1983).
14. 1078 HANREI JIHÇ at 127.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/11
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its subcontractor and completed a commercial product using the
registered utility model. Furthermore, the defendant visited the
registrant and saw the registered system before marketing its own
products.15 Thus, the defendant obviously knew that its products
might infringe the registered monorail system.
The registrant argued that the defendant’s two systems were
within the language of the registrant’s claim, relying on article 26 of
the Utility Model Law.16 In determining the defendant’s liability, the
Osaka District Court interpreted the claim limitations to require that
the rails be on columns. This interpretation resulted in coverage that
included the defendant’s above-ground rail connected to columns
inserted in the ground of the golf course, but excluded the
underground rail attached to the side wall of the groove. Accordingly,
the court found infringement on the system using only the above-
ground system.17 However, as to the combined system, the court
emphasized the improved result of the underground rail and denied
both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. The court ignored the fact that a significant length of the
rail in the combined system was installed on columns and thus was
within the claim as literally read. The registrant also relied on Utility
Model Law article 17 to argue that the defendant’s combined system
infringed its registration because the system utilized the registered
utility model.18 However, the court again found for the defendant,
repeating the reason given to deny literal infringement and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.19
To prevent the registrant from recovering damages in the form of
lost profits, the defendant argued that the registrant did not exploit the
registered model but only its subcontractor exploited the model.20
The Osaka District Court did not agree and stated that the registrant
15. Id. at 131.
16. Utility Model Law article 26 applies mutatus mutandis to Patent Law article 70 on the
technical scope of patents. Jitsuyo Shinan Ho [Utility Model Law], Law No. 123 of 1959, art.
26.
17. 1078 HANREI JIHÇ at 129-30.
18. Utility Model Law article 17, which is similar to Patent Law article 72, provides that
the owner of a utility model right shall not commercially work that right. Jitsuyo Shinan Ho
[Utility Model Law], Law No. 123 of 1959, art. 17.
19. 1078 HANREI JIHÇ at 130.
20. Id. at 125.
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exploited the model jointly with its subcontractor.21 Thus, the court
acknowledged that the registrant was entitled to a recovery of lost
profits if it could establish the amount resulting from the infringing
sales.
However, the court found that the registrant failed to show the
amount and denied registrant’s claim of damages in the form of lost
profits.22 It stated that the registrant could not produce evidence that
sufficiently established its own net profits resulting from the sales of
the registered monorail system. The court then examined whether the
registrant could establish the amount of the defendant’s profits that is
presumed to be the registrant’s lost profits.23 The court again found
that the registrant failed to establish the net profits made by the
defendant through the sales of infringing products, and concluded
that the registrant could not rely on the statutory presumption.24 Thus,
the court denied all of the registrant’s claims to recover lost profits.
The court then examined the last option to calculate damages, a
reasonable royalty.25 In determining the rate for calculating the
royalty, the registrant urged the court to adopt a ten percent royalty
rate but could not produce evidence to support the rate because it had
never licensed anyone. Rejecting the rate advanced by the registrant,
the court acknowledged that there was no established method or
custom to calculate a royalty rate in the business related to the
registered products.26 It therefore adopted the method published by
the JPO to determine a royalty rate in the licensing of government-
owned patents. Calculation under JPO’s method resulted in a three
percent royalty rate. The court further reduced the rate to 2.4%
because the price of the monorail system sold by the defendant
included costs unrelated to the utility model registration, such as
battery installation and golf cart storage.27 Finally, the court did not
adopt the sales of infringement systems claimed by the registrant but
21. Id. at 132.
22. Id.
23. See Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1998, art. 102, para.2.
24. 1078 HANREI JIHÇ at 133.
25. See Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1998, art. 102, para.3.
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only adopted the sales admitted by the defendant.28 As a result, the
court awarded much less than the amount claimed by the registrant as
a reasonable royalty.
2. United States Example: King Instruments v. Perego
In contrast, United States patentees often get the damages they
want unlike Japanese patentees. In King Instruments Corp. v. Luciano
Perego,29 the patentee, King, sued the defendant, a manufacturer of
automatic magnetic tape splicing and winding machines, for
infringement of its three patents. Cassettes available in the market
include two types of tapes: magnetic tape and non-magnetic leader
tape. However, cassettes are originally produced with the closed
leader tape only, and the magnetic tape that records audio or video
signals is later inserted by splicing the magnetic tape into the middle
of the leader tape and winding it onto the cassette. King and the
defendant competed with each other in selling machines that
automatically splice and wind the magnetic tapes into the cassettes.
King’s two patents-in-suit, the ‘153 and ‘123 patents, were
directed to a mechanism for cutting the closed leader tape into two
sections, aligning the magnetic tape with the leader tape, and
applying a splice between the leader and magnetic tapes.30 The
remaining patent-in-suit owned by King, the ‘461 patent, was
directed to a splicing assembly for connecting the magnetic and
leader tapes. Although the patentee alleged infringement of all three
patents, the district court found that the defendant’s machine itself
did not infringe either the ‘153 or ‘123 patent.31 The court, however,
found infringement of the ‘461 patent by the splicing assembly in the
reel changer adopted by the defendant.
Importantly, King did not use the ‘461 patent that was found to be
infringed by the defendant.32 Because the defendant’s machine is a
double-tape reel loader, a reel changer is necessary to switch to the
second reel when the first reel is loaded. In contrast, King’s machine
28. Id. at 133.
29. King Instruments Corp. v. Luciano Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
30. Id. at 944.
31. King Instruments Corp. v. Luciano Perego, 737 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Mass. 1990).
32. King, 65 F.3d at 947.
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was a single-reel loader and thus did not use a reel changer or a splice
assembly used in the reel changer. Responding to the defendant’s
argument that the customers who bought its machines would not have
bought patentee’s machines, the district court acknowledged that the
defendant’s machine is structurally and functionally more advanced
than the patentee’s machine. The court nevertheless upheld causation
between the defendant’s infringing act and the patentee’s lost
profits.33 It only reduced the number of machines claimed by the
patentee to exclude those machines which defendant’s customers
obviously would not have bought.
Although the defendant’s splicing and winding mechanism itself
did not infringe King’s patents and the patentee did not exploit the
patented splicing assembly in the reel changer, the district court
awarded lost profits for the sales of the entire machine plus its spare
parts.34 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of
damages.35 As a result, the patentee was compensated for the sales of
the machine not covered by any of the patentee’s patents, and for the
reel changer that was covered by the patent but was never
manufactured or sold by the patentee.
B. The Source of the Difference in Damage Awards: Policy
Judgments
1. The Theoretical Frameworks Between the United States and
Japan are Not the Reason for of Different Damage Awards
The above two cases clearly indicate a huge difference in damages
awarded by Japanese and United States courts. The Golf Cart
Monorail System Case indicates the reluctance of Japanese courts to
award lost profits and their effort to keep the award to a minimum. In
contrast, King indicates United States court’s preference to award lost
profits. Because lost profits damages are usually larger than
reasonable royalty damages, and because such lost profits are
calculated on the basis of the entire product with the possibility of
33. King, 737 F. Supp. at 1241-42.
34. Id. at 1242.
35. King, 65 F.3d at 953.
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including spare parts and accessories, United States damages awards
are much higher than Japanese awards. This suggests a fundamental
difference in calculating damages between the two systems.
However, the theoretical frameworks used by the two jurisdictions
to determine the scope of damages are not very different. In
determining the scope of damages, both United States and Japanese
courts use a “but for” test to establish the cause in fact and then use a
“foreseeability” test to further limit the scope to the legal cause or
adequate cause (soutou inga kankei).36 The concept of
“foreseeability” or “legal/adequate cause” is commonly used to
define the boundary between those causes which are closely
connected with the result and others which are only remotely
connected with the result, and has the effect of limiting responsibility
for the consequences of one’s act.37 The only difference is that United
States courts’ analysis includes two distinct steps for each course
because a jury decides the cause in fact and a judge decides the legal
cause. In contrast, Japanese judges decide both legal and factual
causes and the steps to analyze the two types of causes are not
distinct.38 This difference aside, the process used to analyze the scope
of damages is similar.
Measurements used by the two jurisdictions are also similar. To
overcome the difficulty in calculating infringement damages, both
United States and Japanese patent law provide options to calculate
damages resulting from infringement.39 The two options for
measuring patent infringement damages, lost profits and reasonable
royalty, are common to the Japanese and United States patent
statutes. A third option, of defendant’s profits, was also once
available under United States patent law but has been eliminated.40
If the theoretical frameworks adopted by the two systems in
determining the scope of damages and calculating the damages are
very similar, where does this huge difference in damage awards come
36. For a discussion of Japanese tort law, see SHINOZUKA, ET AL., MINPÇ 9: FUHOU KOUI
[CIVIL LAW 9: TORT] 97 (1993).
37. See, e.g., TORU IKUYO, FUHOU KOUI HOU [TORT LAW] 122, 134 (1993).
38. YOSHIO HIRAI, SONGAI BAISHOUHOU NO RIRON [THEORY OF DAMAGE
COMPENSATION LAW] 429 (12th ed. 1997).
39. See Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 102; 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
40. DONALD CHISUM, ON PATENTS, § 20.02[3] (1978, Supp. 1999).
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from? To find out the source of the difference, one should focus the
analysis on the related policies of tort and patent law, because the
legal cause or adequate cause which sets the boundary must be set
upon the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.41 The huge
difference in damages in the United States and Japanese jurisdictions
is likely the result of different senses of justice and policy in the two
societies that cause judges to apply the same framework in a radically
different manner.
2. The Huge Difference in Tort and Patent Policies is the Source
of Different Damage Awards
a. General Tort Policy
i. Japan
The most significant difference between the United States and
Japanese legal systems is the role of individuals in enforcing the law.
The Japanese legal system more clearly separates the functions of
criminal sanctions and civil remedies.42 Under the Japanese legal
system, the government exclusively controls punishment and
deterrence of tortious acts.43 The individual’s role in maintaining
public order is limited.44
This clearly affects the function of damages under the general tort
theory. Under Japanese tort law, tort damages function purely to
restore the tort victim to the condition he/she would have been in but
for the tort.45 The Japanese civil legal system does not provide for
increasing damages depending on the character of the tortious act,
such as willful tort. Because deterrence is not a function of tort
41. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264
(5th ed. 1984).
42. Hideo Tanaka & Akio Takeuchi, Hou no Jitsugen ni okeru Shijin no Yakuwari [The
Role of Private Individuals in Enforcing Law] (pts. 1-4), 88 HOUGAKV KYOVKAI ZASSHI 521
(1971), 89 HAUGAKU KYOUKAI ZASSHI 243, 879, 1033 (1972). An excerpt from this article is
published in HIDEO TANAKA, JITTEI HOUGAKU NYUUMON [INTRODUCTION TO SUBSTANTIVE
LAW] 51 (23d ed. 1992).
43. TANAKA, supra note 42, at  51.
44. Id.
45. ICHIRO KATOU, FUHOU KOUI (TORT) 3 (1974).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/11
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damages, Japanese courts do not distinguish tort damages from
breach of a contract damages.
Further, Japanese courts have adopted the principles originally
developed for defining contract damages, and applied them directly
to measure loss resulting from a tort.46 As a result, contract principles
control the measurement of loss resulting both from a tort and a
breach of contract.
ii. United States
In contrast, the separation between the functions of tort damages
and criminal sanctions under the Common Law Tradition, which the
United States legal system follows, is not as clear as that of the
Japanese system.47 The United States legal system combines criminal
sanctions and civil remedies to deter people from engaging in tortious
acts. Under the United States system, individuals are encouraged to
actively participate in enforcing the law by bringing suit.48 Thus, civil
remedies, like damages, are used not only to compensate but also to
deter tortious acts.
Under United States law, damages are classified as either
compensatory damages or punitive damages.49 Although the function
of compensatory damages is to compensate tort victims, the common
law tradition distinguishes contract damages from tort damages50 and
the United States courts traditionally apply different principles to
measure tort and contract damages.51 With respect to the burden of
46. See, e.g., Osaka Shoten v. Murakami Shoten, 5 MINSHã 386 (Cassation KÇTÇ
Saibansho, 1926).
47. TANAKA & TAKEUCHI, supra note 41.
48. Id.
49. For a general discussion of tort damages, see DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES EQUITY RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1993) and KENNETH YORK, ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES
AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1992).
50. R. W. Byrom, Do Damages Depend on the Same Principles Throughout the Law of
Tort and Contract?, 6 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 118 (1968).
51. Felder v. Reeth, 34 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929). However, United States legal
commentators suggest that tort law encompasses contract law through the courts’ application of
tort law principles to measure both tort and contract damages. See GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974); Jeffrey O’Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of
Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1977). This development in United States tort and
contract law contrasts greatly with Japanese courts’ practice of applying contract principles to
both tort and contract damages.
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proof, to prevent a wrongdoer from benefiting from the difficulty of
proving causation between the tortious act and damages, United
States courts require less certainty in the proof of damages for a tort
than in the proof of damages for a breach of contract.52
Further, reflecting the policy of encouraging individuals to
enforce the law, United States tort law provides punitive damages
that may be awarded beyond the amount assessed to compensate
actual damages. Punitive damages function to punish and deter torts
and also to financially assist tort victims by covering attorney fees
and other costs of bringing suit.53 This aspect contrasts sharply with
breach of contract damages, where breaches are not distinguished by
“willfulness” and no punitive damages are awarded.54
b.  Patent Law Policy
i. Japan
Another source of the difference in damages between Japan and
the United States comes from patent policy. Prior to a 1998 revision
of Japanese Patent, patent law provisions for measuring patent
infringement damages also reflected the policies of Japanese general
tort law. Article 102 of the pre-1998 law provided two options for
calculating patent infringement damages: (1) defendant’s profits;55
and (2) a reasonable royalty.56 Patentees could also claim damages in
the form of lost profits under the general tort provision of the Civil
Code,57 but the patent statute did not expressly provide that option.58
The 1998 revised article 102, paragraph one, now expressly allows
claims for lost profit damages.59
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. a  (1979).
53. DAN DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES EQUITY RESTITUTION 475-84 (2d ed.
1993).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, introductory note (1979).
55. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1998, art. 102, para.1.
56. Id. art. 102, para.2.
57. MINPÇ [Civil Code], art. 709.
58. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1998, art. 102. For relation between pre-
1998 Patent Law, article 102, and Civil Code 709, see Nakayama, Chukai Tokkyo Ho Gaisetsu,
PATENT LAW ANNOTATED 861 (2d ed. 1989).
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The language of the pre-1998 article 102 indicates that the
legislature was more concerned about protecting innocent infringers
than about protecting patentees. This emphasis was expressed by
paragraph three of that provision, which gave Japanese courts the
discretion to limit damages to an amount equal to a reasonable
royalty, even if actual damages were higher, unless the infringer
willfully or with gross negligence engaged in infringement. This
provision remains as paragraph four in the 1998 revision of article
102, but may decrease in importance if courts choose to prioritize the
new paragraph one, which allows claims for lost profit damages.60 In
any case, Japanese patent law has not guaranteed a full compensation
of damages because courts are allowed to reduce the amount assessed
to compensate the patentee’s loss.61 This provision, at least under the
pre-1998 article 102, suggests that reasonable royalty has been the
primary basis for calculating patent-infringement damages and that
damages, in the form of an infringer’s profits or lost profits, have
been exceptional and additional.
The legislative history of the pre-1998 article 102 also support this
interpretation. The legislative history indicates that legislators
considered it unfair to have infringers, whose products were not
clearly covered by patented claims, compensated the same amount as
infringers who willfully or with gross negligence infringed the
patented claim.62 Under the Japanese tort system, courts cannot award
damages beyond an amount that is compensatory.63 As a result, the
damage provisions enabled courts only to reduce the amount of
damages below actual damages against innocent infringers, and left
courts unable to increase the amount against willful infringers. This
resulted in a constant loss of money for Japanese patentees who
brought suits because courts seldom award attorney fees, and attorney
fees for patent infringement litigation are relatively more expensive
than other type of cases. 64
60. Id. art. 102, para.1.
61. Id.
62. YOSHIYUKI TAMURA, CHITEKI ZAISANKEN TO SONGAI BAISHOU [INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND COMPENSATION OF DAMAGES] 56 (1993).
63. HIDEO TANAAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 345 (1984).
64. Although Japanese courts award official fees, parties seldom enforce that part of the
judgment because it is too much trouble for them to ask court clerks to calculate the amount and
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ii. United States
In contrast, the goal of United States patent infringement damages
is adequate and full compensation for damages resulting from
infringement.65 The patent statute, for many years, has expressly
stated this goal.66 The current statute provides two options for
calculating infringement damages: (1) lost profits and (2) reasonable
royalty.67 The United States patent statute once provided an option of
infringer’s profits, the first option provided by the pre-1998 Japanese
Patent Law.68 Congress eliminated this option in 1946 because the
option was considered to be redundant with lost profits and difficult
to establish by patentees.69
The language of § 284 indicates that United States legislators are
more concerned about insufficient compensation for patentees than
about harsh results for innocent infringers. No provision exists to
enable courts to reduce damages resulting from innocent
infringement. Instead, the section expressly prevents courts from
awarding damages less than a reasonable royalty.70 Accordingly, the
language of the section is interpreted by courts as being expansive
rather than limiting.71
The language of § 284 indicates concern only for patentees who
are victims of infringement, and indicates no concern for innocent
infringers. Thus, no provision allows courts to reduce the amount
assessed to compensate for damages even if damages are awarded in
the form of lost profits beyond a reasonable royalty. The section only
allows courts to increase compensatory damages up to three times for
enforce the judgment For the discussion of attorney fees, see INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHT
COMMITTEE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, TOKKYO HOU TOU NO KAISEI NI KANSURU TOUSHIN
[INVITITATION OF COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL FOR REVISING PATENT LAW AND OTHER
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS] 95 (1997).
65. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1983).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 284 ¶ 1 (1994).
67. Id.
68. DONALD CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.02.
69. Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 726, § 1, 60 Stat. 778 (1946). For a discussion of
legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 284, see Vincent Tassinari, Patent Compensation under 35
U.S.C., 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59 (1997).
70. 35 U.S.C. § 284 ¶ 1.
71. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co. Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544 (1995).
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victims of willful infringement.72 Further, under § 285, in exceptional
cases courts may also grant attorney fees, which sometimes results in
an amount more than the damage award.73 As a result, unlike
Japanese patentees, United States patentees often make money for
suing infringers.
C. Case Law: Difference Reflecting Policy
1. Lost Profits
a. The Requirement of Patent Invention Exploitation
In interpreting the language of the pre-1998 section 102 to reflect
the underlying policies, Japanese courts have awarded damages in the
form of reasonable royalty in more than fifty percent of all cases, and
have awarded damages in the form of lost profits in less than ten
percent of all cases.74 The first reason why there is a small chance of
obtaining an award of lost profits is that courts do not even bother to
examine the claim of damages in the form of lost profits if patentees
do not exploit their inventions by themselves.75 Therefore, in the Golf
Cart Monorail System Case, the Tokyo District Court examined the
registrant’s claim of lost profits only after making a finding as to the
resitrant’s own sales.76 Since a significant proportion of patents has
never been exploited,77 the patentees of these patents will be
automatically disqualified for claims of lost profits in Japanese
courts.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 284 ¶ 2.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
74. INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CHITEKI ZAISANKEN SHINGAI NI KAKARU
MINJITEKI KYUUSAI NO TEKISEIKA NI KANSURU CHOUSA KENKYUU [STUDY OF APPROPRIATE
CIVIL REMEDIES FOR COMPENSATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAMAGES] 33 (1996)
[hereinafter, IIP DAMAGES REPORT]. For a report in English on Japanese patent infringement
damages, see Toru Toyama, Study with Respect to Proper Civil Remedies for Infringements of
Intellectual Property, 1996 IIP BULL. 62 (1996).
75. See Kazuo MASUI & YOSHIYUKI TAMURA, TOKKYO HANREI GAIDO [GUIDEBOOK OF
PATENT COURT DECISIONS] 277 (2d ed. 1997).
76. 1078 HANREI JIHÇ at 125.
77. See TOWARD THE ERA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CREATION, supra note 2, at 25
(discussing Japanese patents). See also Joseph Rossman & Sanders, The Patent Utilization
Study, in NURTURING NEW IDEAS: LEGAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC ROLES 106 (L. James Harris
ed., 1969) (discussing United States patents).
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United States courts also interpret § 284 to reflect the underlying
policies. First, United States courts, particularly the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, indicate a preference to
award actual damages in the form of lost profits to accommodate the
goal of full compensation expressed in the language of § 284.78 Thus,
courts regard actual damages, such as lost profits, as the primary
option for compensation and award a reasonable royalty only if the
patentee is unable to prove actual damages.79
Courts also interpret the legislative intent as giving only the
bottom line but no ceiling.80 In other words, courts are not limited in
expanding the scope of damages to fully compensate a patentee’s loss
in the form of lost profits, but courts are only limited when they can
award damages in the form of reasonable royalty. United States
courts make every effort to award damages in the form of lost profits
and are reluctant to accept a defendant’s argument denying causation,
which would lead to an award of reasonable royalty.
Accordingly, it is not difficult to persuade United States courts to
grant an award of lost profits. Unlike Japanese courts’ practice,
United States courts do not automatically reject claims of damages in
the form of lost profits when a patentee does not exploit his
invention.81 In King, the Federal Circuit emphasized the danger of
insufficient compensation and a retroactive compulsory license that
may result from the practice of requiring patentee’s exploitation of
the patented invention.82 The court then viewed that such practice
would encourage infringement.83 Furthermore, in an earlier en banc
decision, Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that normally
there can be no lost profits when the patentee does not exploit his
invention at all, although it emphasized that “whether a patentee sells
78. For a general discussion of Federal Circuit case law on patent infringement damages,
see Paul Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages (A Review of Recent Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691 (1993); Laura
Pincus, The Computation of Damages in Patent Infringement Actions, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 95
(1991).
79. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
80. See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544.
81. See id. at 1546.
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its patented invention is not crucial in determining lost profits
damages.”84
According to the court, denying the patentees their recovery of
lost profits where they chose to market a competing, but non-patented
product, as was the situation in King, would undermine the
constitutional goal to give incentives for innovation.85 Another
example raised by the court was where a patentee obtained multiple
patents on three alternative substitutes because the three substitutes
could not be comprehended in a single claim.86 If a patentee exploited
only one substitute but the patent covering another substitute was
infringed, limiting the patentee’s recovery to a reasonable royalty
would result in a compulsory license to the willful infringer.87
Finally, in King, the Federal Circuit referred to a practice adopted
by Japanese courts of checking whether the patentee’s product
embodies the infringing claim as “reverse infringement,” and noted
that the practice makes the litigation proceeding more cumbersome
and complex.88 The court concluded that such a practice, to show the
patentee’s exploitation, is not required under § 284.89 As a result,
United States patentees are given a fair chance to prove lost profits
even if they have not made or sold any products embodying the
infringing patent.
b. Burden of Proof and Other Procedural Aspects
The second reason explaining the difficulty in establishing a claim
of lost profits in Japanese courts is the high burden of proof. Even if a
patentee exploits her invention and passes the first test, she must
establish causation between the infringer’s infringement and
damages. Under the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff
wishing to establish damages has the burden of producing evidence,
which removes all possible doubts as to the presence or absence of
84. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1548.
85. King, 65 F.3d at 950.
86. Id. at 952.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 952.
89. Id.
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the fact.90 This standard is considered by Japanese civil procedure
scholars to be much higher than the preponderance rule but a little bit
lower than a clear and convincing rule.91 Even after a finding of
liability on infringers, Japanese courts treat parties equally and
impose this high burden of proof on patentees. Thus, Japanese
patentees often fail to establish causation between lost profits and the
act of infringement.
Japanese patentees were further hindered from recovering lost
profits by the lack of an effective measure under the old civil
procedure law to collect evidence on damages.92 Although article 105
of the pre-1999 revision enabled patentees to request infringers to
produce documents necessary for calculation of damages,93 courts
often allowed infringers to refuse to produce the requested document
when the document included proprietary information.94 Japanese
courts accepted this excuse because Japanese civil procedure law
provided no proceeding to protect proprietary information at trial.
Documents necessary for calculating lost profits often include
proprietary information, such as net profits and costs of materials.
Therefore, infringers often avoided the duty imposed by the pre-1999
version of article 105 by requesting protection of proprietary
information. The Golf Cart Monorail Case is a typical example of a
patentee not being able to introduce sufficient evidence to support the
number of infringing sales it claimed. As a result, the court
recognized only the number of sales to which the infringer
90. NAKANO MIKAZUKI ET AL., MINJI SOSHOHO ENSHU [CIVIL PROCEDURE SEMINAR]
288 (1983).
91. In Japanese courts, parties must convince judges about the absence or presence of fact
to an eighty percent certainty. See RYUJI FUNAKOSHI, JITTEIHOU CHITSUJO TO SHOUMEI
SEKININ [ORDER OF LAW AND BURDEN OF PROOF] 12 (1996); HIROMI MURAKAMI, MINJI
SAIBAN NI OKERU SHOUMEI SEKININ [BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL PROCEDURE] 6 (1980).
92. For a general discussion of the revised Civil Procedure Law, see Ryu Takabayashi,
Practices of Patent Litigation in Japanese Courts, 5-2 CASRIP NEWSL. 13 (1998) available at
<http://www.law.washington.edu/~casrip/newsletter/newsv5i2jp2. html>.
93. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art. 105.
94. See MINSOHÇ [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 220, no. 4. See also JAPANESE PATENT
OFFICE, KOUGYOU SHOYUUKEN SHINGIKAI KIKAKU SHO-IINKAI HOUKOKUSHO: PURO
PATENTO SEISAKU NO ISSOU NO SHINKA NI MUKETE [REPORT BY PLANNING SUBCOMMITTEE
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admitted.95
Further, the lack of a proceeding to protect proprietary
information forces patentees to choose between disclosing
information and giving up a claim of lost profits. For example, in the
Golf Cart Monorail System Case, the registrant was very unlikely to
produce sufficient evidence because the evidence included
proprietary information relating to a registrant’s net profits.
Consequently, the court rejected the registrant’s claim of lost profits.
In contrast, United States courts do not impose such a high burden
of proof on patentees. Reflecting the general tort policy of requiring
less certainty to prove tort damages, United States courts only require
patentees to show causation with a reasonable probability.96 Unlike
Japanese courts, United States courts clearly show their preference
for patentees once an infringer’s liability is decided. The Federal
Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that patentees need not negate
every possibility that customers of infringing products might not have
bought another product or might not have bought any comparable
product at all.97 The court also noted that any doubts regarding the
calculation of damages must be resolved against the infringer.98
Additionally, the discovery process under the United States
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables patentees to collect the
documents necessary to calculate lost profits.99 Due to extensive
sanctions, United States patentees can readily obtain information
necessary for calculating lost profits. United States civil procedure
provides a proceeding for protecting proprietary information at
trial.100 Thus, United States patentees seldom fail to establish their
own net profits.
95. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 37.
96. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 21 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
97. King Instruments Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985), appeal after
remand, 814 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
98. Kaufman Co. v. Lautech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
99. For a general discussion of discovery procedure, see ROGER HAYDOCK & DAVID
HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE (2d ed. 1988); KIMBARY PACE MOORE ET AL., PATENT
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 97 (1999).
100. HAYDOCK & HERR, supra note 99,  § 1.9.
Washington University Open Scholarship
217.doc 08/24/00
328 Re-Engineering Patent Law [Vol. 2:309
c. Positive and Negative Tests for Causation
The third difficulty of claiming lost profits in Japanese courts is
the lack of case law on positive tests or factors to show causation
between an act of infringement and lost profits. Japanese patentees
often argue that their lost profits are the amount of net profits of their
own products multiplied by the number of infringing products sold by
infringers. Japanese courts find that showing such an amount alone is
insufficient to show causation, and do not grant any part of lost
profits recovery, stating that the patentee did not show causation.101
However, they never give any clue as to what showing is necessary to
establish causation. Consequently, Japanese courts find causation
only in exceptional cases where only two competitors exist in a
unique market102 or where the infringing product is exactly the same
as patentee’s product.103
In contrast, Japanese courts developed significant case law on
factors to negate causation.104 Courts have rejected a lost profits
claim for lack of causation when: (1) the patented part did not attract
customers to purchase the whole product;105 (2) the infringing
product was not exactly the same as the patentee’s product;106 (3)
infringing products were less expensive than the patentee’s
product;107 or (4) a substitute of the patented product was available in
the market.108
In contrast, United States courts seldom accept the arguments of
an infringer to negate causation. For example, in King, the infringing
101. Asahi Ishimoto Kogyo v. Kamishima Kagaku Kokyo, 156 HANREI TASMUZU 218
(Tokyo ChihÇ Saibansho 1964).
102. See, e.g., Ando Card Kogyo v. Nihon Jimuki, 154 HANREI TAIMUZU 138 (Tokyo
ChihÇ Saibansho 1964).
103. See, e.g., Shintoron Co. v. Nitto Denki Seisakusho, 152 HANREI TAIMUZU 163 (Tokyo
ChihÇ Saibansho 1964). For a review of cases granting a recovery of lost profits, see IIP
DAMAGE REPORT, supra note 74, at 33-35.
104. See MASUI & TAMURA, supra note 75, at 278.
105. See, e.g., Sadaharu Tada v. Ooki Seisakusho, 136 HANREI TAIMUZU 116 (Tokyo
ChihÇ Saibansho 1962).
106. See, e.g., Takeya Kagaku v. Shuupura Kogyo, 1988 TOKKYO KANRI HANKETSU SHU,
268 (Osaka ChihÇ Saibarsho 1987).
107. See, e.g., Tsugami Seisakusho v. Taiyo Seiki Seisakusho, 185 HANREI TAIMUZU 209
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machine that used a double-reel loader was structurally and
functionally different, and more advanced, than the patentee’s
machine that used a single-reel loader. A United States district court
only discounted the patentee’s lost sales based on the structural
difference, finding that such difference was not sufficient to negate
the causation.109 The Federal Circuit affirmed this conclusion.110 In
contrast, in the Golf Cart Monorail Case, the defendant introduced a
similar argument. Although the court did not express its view on the
argument, the functional difference appeared to be one of the reasons
that persuaded the court to deny causation and reject the patentee’s
claim of lost profits. Accordingly, had King been decided by a
Japanese court, the court would have been very likely to deny “but
for” causation, resulting in no recovery of lost profits, even if King
was exploiting the infringed splicing assembly.
The lack of a positive test for causation and the presence of too
many negative tests significantly discourages Japanese patentees
from claiming lost profits. Therefore, if Japanese patentees exploit
their patented inventions, they prefer to claim a recovery of
defendant’s profits.111 The patent statute provides a presumption that
an infringer’s profits are equal to the patentee’s lost profits.112 This
practice saves Japanese courts the time of examining complicated
factual issues in finding causation. At the same time, this practice
imposes the burden on Japanese patentees to prove net profits of the 
infringer instead of their own profits, as is done if lost profits are
claimed. Because of the difficulty of obtaining evidence to show the
opposing party’s net profits, patentees often fail to establish such
profits.113
Moreover, patentees are not allowed to recover an infringer’s
profits when the patent covers only part of the entire product, and are
required to show the contribution rate, kiyo-ritsu, of the patented part
109. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 737 F. Supp. 1227, 1242 (D. Mass. 1990).
110. King, 65 F.3d at 953.
111. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 29. Patentees included lost profits as their
primary claims of damages in only 15.8% of all cases. Id.
112. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1998, art. 102, para. 1.
113. See, e.g., Fuji Denko v. Sanko, Hanrei Kogyo Shoyuken-Ho 2535-279 (Osaka Koto
Saibansho 1986).
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versus the non-patented part.114 Patentees must show apportionment
between the patented part and the non-patented part and are entitled
only to a recovery of the defendant’s profits derived from the
patented part of the product.115 If a patentee is unable to establish the
contribution rate, the court may deny the entire claim of defendant’s
lost profits.116 Further, Japanese courts do not allow a recovery for
spare parts or accessories of the patented products.117
Even if patentees are entitled to defendant’s profits for the entire
product, such profits are often less than the patentee’s own lost
profits because infringers are often the second comer in the market
and do not enjoy the benefit of a monopoly price.118 Because of these
difficulties, full recovery of defendant’s profits was awarded in only
16.4% of  those cases that sought  recovery of defendant’s profits.119
On average, Japanese courts have granted only 53% of the amount
claimed by patentees as infringer’s profits.120
In contrast, the Federal Circuit developed case law with more
positive tests for causation than negative tests. First, where only the
patentee and infringer are competitors in the market, which is an
exceptional circumstance and even Japanese courts would find
causation, courts find causation without further evidence.121 Other
circumstances where courts find sufficient causation include: when
the patent owner lost the sales to the infringer under a bidding
system;122 when the entry and departure of the infringer’s product in
114. MASUI & TAMURA, supra note 75, at 294.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Rickka Mishin v. Maruzen Mishin, 223 HANREI TAIMUZU 200 (Tokyo
ChihÇ Saibansho 1968).
117. See, e.g., Yokoyama Kogyo v. Hayakawa Tekko, 229 HANREI TAIMUZU 231 (Tokyo
ChihÇ Saibansho 1969)
118. A good example is Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152
(6th Cir. 1978). The infringer cut the patentee’s price 30% to compete with the patentee’s
product.
119. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 36.
120. Id.
121. See Yale Lock Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536 (1886); Marsh-McBirney, Inc. v.
Montedoro-Whitney Corp., 882 F.2d 498, 505 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
122. See Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. Syracuse, 45 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1930); Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1219 (E.D. Pa. 1989), further opinion,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1989), aff’d, 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/11
217.doc 08/24/00
2000] Patent Infringement Damages in Japan and the U.S. 331
the market forces a change in price of the patentee’s products;123 and,
when the infringer was either a former customer or supplier to the
customer.124
Even in cases where such exceptional circumstances do not exist,
United States courts have developed a positive test to infer causation.
This test includes four factors to infer causation and is referred to as
the “Panduit” test, named for the case that adopted the test.125 These
four factors are:  (1) a presence of demand for patented products in
the market; (2) an absence of acceptable, non-infringing alternatives;
(3) patentee’s own capacity to have met that demand; and (4) the
amount of profits the patentee would have made. 126 A patentee can
demonstrate the demand for the patented products by showing that
the infringers sold infringing products.127 Showing the capability to
manufacture is not difficult because courts require only potential
capability, which can be demonstrated by the possibility of
subcontracting the increased portion of manufacture and of hiring
new sales persons to sell that portion.128 This is in stark contrast with
the practice of Japanese courts, which require patentees to show the
capability to manufacture and sell additional products with a high
degree of certainty.129
Of the first three factors, showing the second factor, the absence
of alternatives, is the most difficult. However, even this showing is
easy because the Federal Circuit has developed a strict test for
showing acceptable alternatives in order to shift the burden of proof
from the patentee to the infringer. This test requires a finding that the
alleged alternative has all of the features and functions of the
patented products, which often leads to an absence of acceptable
alternatives, the alternatives being less effective and inadequate.130
123. See Pressed Prism Glass Co. v. Continuous Glass Prism Co., 181 F. 151 (C.C.W.D.
Pa. 1910); Hall v. Stern, 20 F. 788 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1884).
124. See Central Soya Co. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573 (1983).
125. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibreworks, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1977).
126. For a general discussion of these factors, see CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[1][b][v].
127. Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
128. Id.
129. 270 TOKKYO TO KIGYOU 54 (Osaka ChihÇ Saibansho 1991).
130. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 788 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
Federal Circuit may apply a less stringent test, see SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena
Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991), aff’g 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (E.D.
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Because a non-infringing product by definition lacks at least some
features or functions of the patented product, a patentee can easily
point out the difference between the non-infringing alternative
alleged by the infringer and the patented products and argue that the
alternative is inadequate to constitute an acceptable alternative.131
Even if an infringer successfully shows an acceptable alternative, so
the patentee fails on the second factor, courts may exercise their own
discretion and award lost profits based on market share.132
In contrast, there are only a few negative tests to reject causation
under the case law of the Federal Circuit. Negative tests may function
to reduce the number of lost sales that the patentee can show but do
not prevent a recovery of lost profits completely. As King teaches,
the presence of a substitute or competitor in the market does not
negate causation, but only reduces the number of products the
patentee would have sold based on the market share. Even a major
difference in structure and function between the patentee’s product
and the defendant’s product does not negate causation but only
reduces the number the patentee would have sold. Evidence that the
product of the infringer is less expensive than the patentee’s product
is not sufficient to negate causation.133
Once the first three factors are demonstrated, patentees show the
fourth factor, profits, by simply estimating the expected profits that
the patentee would have made from the infringing sales.134 This
amount is calculated by multiplying the patentee’s net profits per unit
of product by the number of units sold by infringers.135 Unlike
Tex. 1989). For a general discussion of the definition of non-infringing alternatives, see
CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[1][b][v] [E].
131. Judge Nies criticized the definition requiring a strict identity and clarified that
acceptable alternatives do not represent an embodiment of the patented invention. SmithKline
Diagnostics, Inc., 926 F.2d at 1166.
132. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990). For a general discussion of the market share approach, see Joel
Meyer, Note, State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo and the Market Share Approach to Patent
Damages: What is Happening to the Panduit Test?, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 1369 (1991).
133. Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10 (1886); SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena
Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 116 (Fed. Cir. 1991), aff’g 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1375 (E.D. Tex.
1989). However, if demand for the patented product is elastic, courts may negate causation. See
BIC Leisure Prods. v. Windsurfing Int’l Inc., 1 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
134. Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1427-28 (1988).
135. Pincus, supra note 78, at 113.
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Japanese practice which requires patentees to show the defendant’s
profits, United States practice is patentee-friendly because a patentee
can readily show its own profits.
Finally, the entire-market-value rule relieves patentees from the
significant burden of establishing apportionment between patented
and non-patented parts when a patent covers only a part of the
product.136 The difficulty related to apportionment was well
understood by the United States patent community from experiences
dealing with the eliminated measurement of defendant’s profits.137
Before United States courts widely adopted the entire-market-value
rule, United States courts had responded to apportionment problems
as Japanese courts did, by rejecting any recovery of lost profits
because of the patentee’s failure to provide a basis of
apportionment.138 Patentees now establish that the value of the entire
product depends on the patented part, instead of showing the
perplexing apportionment and can recover lost profits for the entire
product.139
Not surprisingly, it is easy for patentees to persuade the Federal
Circuit to apply the entire-market-value rule. In early cases, courts set
a high hurdle for taking advantage of the rule by requiring an
additional showing that the whole machine’s entire value is “properly
and legally” attributable to the patented feature.140 The Court of
Claims, one of two predecessor courts to the Federal Circuit, also
required the additional showing of a paramount importance of the
patented features in substantially creating the value of the non-
patented features.141 Although the Federal Circuit in early cases
followed these precedents,142 courts in more recent cases no longer
require the additional showing. For example, in King, the court
136. See CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[1].
137. Id. § 20.02[3].
138. See, e.g., Westinghouse v. New York Air Brake Co., 140 F. 545, 550-51 (2d Cir.
1905); Roemer v. Simon, 31 F. 41, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1887).
139. The leading case for the entire-market-value rule is Goulds Mfg. Co. v. Cowing. 105
U.S. 253 (1881).
140. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604,
615 (1912).
141. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 1 (Ct. Cl. 1942), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
142. State Industries, 883 F.2d at 1480.
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granted lost profits for the entire machine even as to non-patented
spare parts when the “but for” test was met, noting that “the entire
market recognizes that the economic value of a patent may be greater
than the value of the sales of the patented part alone.”143 As properly
noted by Judge Nies in her dissenting opinion,144 this change in the
Federal Circuit’s attitude toward the entire-market-value rule has led
to the strange result that a recent Federal Circuit panel affirmed the
district court’s award of damages to recover for spare parts of a non-
patented machine, even though an old panel of the same court did not
allow a recovery of damages for spare parts of a patented machine in
another case.145
As clearly demonstrated by King, recent Federal Circuit cases
suggest that the condition is met by showing the presence of a
patented part because to extend the recovery to the entire product, the
court does not require patentees to meet the requirement for applying
the entire-market value rule.146 This practice shifts the burden to the
infringer to prevent the court from applying the entire-market-value
rule. Further, the Federal Circuit may apply the entire-market-value
test to enable patentees to recover damages for lost sales of
accessories and separate products that are sold with patented
products.147 This frequent application of the entire-market-value rule
not only removes the burden of proof to show apportionment from
patentees, it also expands the recovery of damages significantly.
2. Reasonable Royalty
a. The Function of Prior Royalty and Industry Standard
Japanese courts have granted damages in the form of a reasonable
royalty in more than half of all cases.148 The royalty is defined as the
amount that a patentee ordinarily receives as compensation for
143. King, 65 F.3d at 950 n.4.
144. Id. at 956-57.
145. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari, 767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1016 (1986).
146. King, 65 F.3d at 957.
147. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544.
148. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 39.
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allowing exploitation of the patented invention. The reasonable
royalty functions as a minimum compensation for infringement;
although, the statute does not expressly provide for this.149 However,
it is difficult for patentees to persuade courts to grant the full amount
of reasonable royalty requested by the patentee. This difficulty is
clearly indicated by the low proportion of cases (31.1%) where the
requested amount was fully awarded.150 The amount of royalty
actually awarded on average is much less (63%) than the amount
requested by patentees.151
One reason for the low royalty award is the difficulty of
establishing the number of infringing products sold by the defendant.
The same problem of collecting evidence, explained earlier with
respect to lost profits, also applies to the proof of the defendant’s
sales.152 Because of the lack of proof, courts often allow recovery of a
royalty only with respect to the number of sales that infringers
admit.153
Another reason is that Japanese courts attempt to limit the royalty
rates to a minimum. First, if there is a prior license for acts
comparable to those engaged in by the infringer without authority,
courts do not award a reasonable royalty more than the royalty rate
that was agreed upon in the legally negotiated license.154 In other
words, the royalty rate for the prior license functions as the maximum
recovery. Although many courts adopted the prior royalty rates as a
reasonable royalty,155 a significant number of courts reduce the
awarded rate to the lower of two published royalty rates (if either was
lower than the prior royalty):156 (1) the rate published by the Japanese
Patent Office for licensing government owned patents;157 and (2) the
149. In a few older cases, courts did not award any damages even though they found
infringement. Tsugami Seisakusho v. Taiyo Seiki Seisakusho, 185 HANREI TAIMUZU 209
(Tokyo Chiho Saibansho 1965). However, patentees in these cases only claimed lost profits and
did not claim a reasonable royalty.
150. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 39.
151. Id.
152. See supra Part I.C.1.b.
153. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 40.
154. Id. at 41. Courts consistently rejected patentees’ arguments to adopt a rate higher than
the legally negotiated prior royalty rate. Id.
155. Id. at 41. Courts adopted prior royalty rates in 29 cases out of 90 cases (32.2%).
156. Id. at 40.
157. HATSUMEI KYOUKAI KENKYUUSHO, JISSHIRYOU RITSU [ROYALTY RATES] 159 (4th
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industry-standard royalty rate published by a quasi-governmental
research institution.158
In contrast, reasonable royalties awarded by United States courts
are much more than the reasonable royalties awarded by Japanese
courts. Under United States patent law an exiting royalty rate agreed
upon between the patentee and its licensees is important evidence for
deciding a reasonable royalty rate.159 United States courts have
developed case law that lists five conditions for qualifying a prior-
license royalty as the “established” royalty, and courts should not
award damages less than the royalty once the patentee shows the
established royalty.160 The royalty must be: (1) paid or secured before
the infringement; (2) paid by a sufficient number of licensees to
indicate a general acquiescence in its reasonableness; (3) uniform in
the region where issued; (4) not paid under threat of suit or in
settlement of litigation; and (5) in consideration of comparable rights
or activity under the patent.161
In recent cases United States courts began to frequently deny the
presence of an “established” royalty as being artificial and instead
adopt a royalty higher than that for prior licenses.162 The motivating
reason for United States courts to award higher royalties is to deter
infringement. If a court awards damages equal to the royalty of a
legally negotiated license, then infringers can save the trouble of
negotiating licenses and benefit from infringement. To prevent this,
the established royalty functions as a minimum recovery.163
When no established rate exists, United States courts, like
Japanese courts, give considerable weight to the royalty rate of a
prior license even if the rate is not qualified as being “established.”164
However, the practice of United States courts contrasts with Japanese
ed. 1993).
158. Id.
159. For a general discussion of the established royalty rate, see CHISUM, supra note 40,
§ 20.03[2].
160. Id. § 20.03[2] [c].
161. See Rude v. Wescott, 130 U.S. 152 (1899); Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.
1952).
162. Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co. Ltd., 847 F.2d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
163. United States Nat’l Bank of Portland, Oregon v. Fabri-Value Co. of Am., 235 F.2d
565 (9th Cir. 1965). For a general discussion, see CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[2][c].
164. CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[3][b][i].
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courts because United States courts gives less weight to an industry
standard of royalty for a license of comparable technology.165 Instead,
they heavily rely on particular license policies and arrangements
selected by the patentee for the infringing patent and related
technology fields. In particular, if the patentee has chosen not to
license the patent in order to benefit from exclusivity, courts increase
the “reasonable royalty” because otherwise it would result in a
compulsory license to the infringer.166 United States case law
frequently adopts a definition of reasonable royalty as that which
would have resulted from a hypothetical negotiation between a
willing patent owner and a willing potential user.167 However, the
royalties granted by United States courts are much more than
reasonable, which often leaves no profits for infringers, and can even
force them into bankruptcy.168
This is in stark contrast to the practice of Japanese courts of
adopting a minimum royalty published by the JPO for patent
damages in cases where the patentee never licensed the patent. As a
result, average damages in the form of reasonable royalty awarded by
United States courts, 11%,169 is significantly higher than the average
rate of 4.2% awarded by Japanese courts. Moreover, United States
rates are spread over a wider range from less than 1% to more than
20%.170
b. Absence of Prior License
Absence of prior license leads to vast differences in United States
and Japanese damages. Typically, like the Tokyo District Court in the
Golf Cart Monorail System Case, if the patentee has not licensed any
comparable technology and has no information for calculating a
royalty rate, courts tend to rely on the JPO’s published rate.
Accordingly, cases adopting the JPO’s royalty rates occupy a
165. Bio-Rad Laboratory Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604 (Fed. Cir 1984).
166. King, 65 F.3d at 950.
167. CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[3][a].
168. See, e.g., Radio Steel, 788 F.2d at 1554; Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572,
(Fed. Cir. 1996).
169. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 67.
170. CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[3][d].
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significant portion of all cases awarding damages in the form of a
reasonable royalty.171 Because the JPO’s royalty rates are kept to a
minimum, in order to encourage transfer of technology from
government to industry, the average rate of reasonable royalty
awarded by Japanese courts is very low (4.2%),172 even lower than
the average rate under the industry-standard of reasonable royalty
(4.6%).173
In contrast, United States courts give less weight to industry
standard174 and more weight to the patent owner’s licensing policy.175
Absence of prior license gives United States courts an opportunity to
increase a royalty rate because it may be viewed by United States
courts as evidence that the patentee adopted a policy not to license
others to use right exclusively. An award of a reasonable royalty
determined by the market would result in a compulsory license on
patentees who have never wanted to license. Thus, to avoid such a
result, court tends to award a rate greater than what would have been
reached by willing licensee and licensor.176
In the Golf Cart Monorail System Case, the Osaka District Court
adopted the JPO’s published royalty rate because the registrant did
not license the utility model to anyone.177 The court further reduced
the rate by the contribution rate, 80%.  If the case had been litigated
in a United States court, the court would have granted the maximum
royalty rate because of several factors that make it necessary for an
increased royalty to adequately compensate the registrant’s damages.
The first factor is the registrant’s absence of prior license. Another
factor is that the infringer has to be ordered by a court to pay
damages, instead of agreeing to a reasonable royalty. By doing so, the
infringer saves negotiation cost. Furthermore, the entire-market-value
rule would have prevented the court from reducing the royalty by the
171. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 41. 21.1% of all cases that awarded
reasonable royalties adopted the JPO’s published rates. Id.
172. Id. at 41.
173. KENKYUUSHO, supra note 157, at 22-23.
174. CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[3][b][ii].
175. Id. § 20.03[3][b][iii].
176. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978);
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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contribution rate.
Specifically, the defendant in the Golf Cart Monorail Case visited
and saw the registered monorail system before developing the
infringing monorail. This fact strongly suggests the defendant’s
willful infringement of the registered utility model. If a jury found
willful infringement, the punitive damage provision in the second
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 284 would have enabled a district court to
increase the actual damages up to three times. Given the same facts,
United States patent owners are awarded much larger damages than
Japanese patent owners.
II. POST-1998 LAW
A. New Direction: SmithKline Cimetidine
To enforce its pro-patent policy, the Japanese Patent Office has
recently published a series of reports that review patent infringement
damages awarded by Japanese courts. One report proposes that the
patent statutes should be revised to do the following: (1) shift the
burden of proof to the defendant once the patentee shows causation
with a reasonable probability; (2) make it possible for a patentee to
recover lost profits regardless of the patentee’s exploitation of the
patent; (3) award a royalty greater than what would have been agreed
to by legally negotiated licensees; (4) in cases of willful
infringement, give courts the power to increase damages up to three
times the amount found as compensatory damages; (5) adopt the
entire-market-value rule to extend damage recovery to the entire
product and convoyed sales.178 Obviously, these proposals were
strongly influenced by Federal Circuit case law doctrines.
Because the JPO has extensively published their intent to revise
the Japanese Patent Statute to implement the proposal, Japanese
courts responded to the JPO’s pro-patent policy quickly. In
SmithKline Cimetidine,179 the Tokyo District Court granted $23.5
178. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHT COMMITTEE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, TOKKYO HOU
TOU NO KAISEI NI KANSURU TOUSHIN [INVITITATION OF COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL FOR
REVISING PATENT LAW AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS] (1997).
179. SmithKline & Beecham French Laboratories Ltd. v. Fujimoto Seiyaku, 1653 HANREI
JIHO 54 (Tokyo Chiho Saibansho 1999). A case comment on this case by a Japanese legal
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million in lost profits damages despite many factors that would have
worked favorably to the accused infringer, if the court followed the
traditional Japanese patent infringement damages. The patentee in the
Smithkline Cimetidine case, Smithkline & Beecham French
Laboratory (SKF) and its subsidiary, Smithkline Beecham Seiyaku
K.K. (SBS) jointly sued a Japanese generic drug manufacturer,
Fujimoto Seiyaku K.K. SKF owned a Japanese patent (Japanese
Patent No. 1,062,766) for a process producing a chiano-guinidine
compound called “cimetidine,” a pharmaceutical product that
effectively treats ulcerative diseases. SBS is the exclusive licensee of
the ‘766 patent for selling the compound in Japan under the
trademark “Tagamet.” The only claim of the ‘677 patent identified a
compound as starting material that would react with amine described
by R1NH2 to produce a compound described by the formula: 1-
chiano – 2 –methyl – 3 - [2-[ ( 5 – methyl – 4 -imidazol) methylthio]
ethyl] guanidine.
The accused infrigner, Fujimoto, did not produce the accused
product. Instead, it imported the product from Yugoslavia (Slovenia)
and sold it in Japan. Because the patent at issue relates to a process, it
was difficult to establish how the products were made outside Japan.
Because of the lack of effective measures to collect evidence under
Japanese Civil Procedure,180 Patent Law article 104 remedies this
difficulty and provides conditions to shift the patentee’s burden of
proof to the defendant. 181 In short, if the product was not publicly
known as of the filing date of the process patent at issue, it is
presumed to have been produced by the patented process.182 Thus, the
provisions allowed the plaintiffs to show that Fujimoto’s cimetidine
was produced by its patented process by showing that the cimetidine
was not publicly known on the priority date of the Japanese patent
application.
Fujimoto argued that SKF’s ‘766 patent was not entitled to the
scholar is published in 484 HANREI HYORON 211 (1999). An English summary of this
judgement was reported in 5-3 CASRIP NEWSL. 7 (1998).
180. The lack of discovery system was discussed supra Part I.
181. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1958, art. 104.
182. For an interpretation of the provision by the JPO, see JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE
EDITION, KOUGYOU SHOYUUKEN HOU CHIKUJO KAISETU [ANNOTATED INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
RIGHT LAWS] 243 (13th ed. 1996).
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benefit of a priority date because the ‘776 patent was not based on a
first application in a Paris Member State and thus failed to meet the
requirements necessary to enjoy the priority right.183 Cimetidine was
publicly known as of its actual Japanese filing date and thus SKF
cannot rely on article 104 to show that Fujimoto’s cimetidine was
produced by the patented process. In arguing for rejection of the
priority benefit, Fujimoto contended that SKF filed two U.K.
applications (filed on March 9, 1971, and July 22, 1971) earlier than
the U.K. applications (filed on September 5, 1972, and February 8,
1973), which the priority of the ‘677 patent is based, and the earlier
U.K. applications also disclosed the patented cimetidine. Although
the earlier U.K. applications disclosed a genus compound of
cimetidine, but did not expressly disclose cimetidine and its
manufacturing process, Fujimoto believed that one skilled in the art
would have readily produced cimetidine from the disclosure in the
earlier U.K. applications.184
This was supported by SKF’s filing of a divisional application
based on another Japanese application (filed March 9, 1972), which
enjoyed the priority date of the earlier 1971 U.K. applications.
Although the divisional application expressly described the
cimetidine and its manufacturing process as embodiments, the
divisional application was allowed to enjoy the 1972 Japanese
application’s original 1971 U.K. priority date. This indicated that the
JPO’s view was that the inclusion of cimeditine, and its process, in
the application were understood by one skilled in the art and thus the
divisional application did not introduce new matter. Because the
application of the ‘677 patent is not based on the first application in
Paris Member States, the earlier 1971 U.K. applications, but is based
on the later 1972/1973 applications, Fujimoto argued that the ‘677
patent fails to meet the requirements for enjoying the priority.
Without enjoyment of the priority date, the ‘677 patent’s application
date should move back to its actual Japanese filing date, September 5,
1973. Because the 1972 Japanese application implicitly disclosing
cimeditine was laid open to public on December 16, 1972, cimetidine
was publicly known as of its filing date and SKF cannot rely on
183. Paris Convention, article 4C(2).
184. See 1653 HANREI JIHO, at 58.
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article 104 to show infringement of the process patent.185 In case the
court was not persuaded by the argument, Fujimoto also introduced
evidence to rebut the presumption of article 104.186 To show that its
product was produced by a process different from the ‘677 patent
process, Fujimoto introduced production records of its product
prepared by the supplier in Solvania.187
With respect to damages, the plaintiffs requested a total of 5,000
M Yen ($38.5M), including: (1) lost profits with respect to SBS
based on lost sales caused by Fujimoto; and (2) unjust enrichment
with respect to SKF for failing to pay the 5% license royalty fees.188
First, Fujimoto claimed that SBS was not the exclusive licensee of
the ‘677 patent because several other Japanese companies sell
cimetidine.189 It also argued that there is no causation between sales
of infringing products and SBS’s reduced sales, stating that the
significant reduction of SBS’s sales resulted from the withdrawal of
SBS’s Japanese distributor from Tagemet’s sales.190 Particularly,
Fujimoto emphasized the presence of an acceptable substitute, the
entrance of “Zantac” and other non-infringing substitutes, reduced
the sales of SBS’s sales. Fujimoto further disputed the amount of the
infringing products and the profits of SBS’s product.191 Additionally,
it requested application of the three-year statute of limitations to
earlier sales of infringing products.192 With respect to claims based on
unjust enrichment, Fujimoto viewed 5% as too high and requested a
2% royalty, that is the lowest published rate, within the 2-4% range,
for licensing government-owned patents.193
The Tokyo District Court agreed with the plaintiff, found
infringement by Fujimoto’s product and accepted evidence produced
by the plaintiff to calculate damages. In denying Fujimoto’s argument
185. Id.
186. An accused infringer can rebut the presumption by showing that the product was not
made by a non-infringing process. See NOBUHIRO NAKAYAMA, CHUKAI TOKKYO HO GAISETSU
[PATENT LAW ANNOTATED] 945 (2d ed. 1989).
187. 1653 HANREI JIHO, at 58.
188. Id. at 56.




193. 1653 HANREI JIHÇ, at 60.
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with respect to losing priority, the court agreed with the plaintiff that
the disclosure of the structure of a genus chemical compound would
not enable one skilled in the art to understand a process of producing
a species compound of the genus compound unless the species
compound and its property are identified as well as a process of
producing the compound are disclosed by discussing an embodiment
of the process.194 Since the earlier 1971 U.K. applications merely
disclosed the structure of a generic compound of cimetidine, it did
not disclose cimetidine itself or its manufacturing process. The court
rejected Fujimoto’s argument to view cimetidine implicitly disclosed
in the 1971 U.K. application and thus did not introduce a new matter,
stating that the proceeding of an application after pending in the
Japanese Patent Office does not affect whether the application is
entitled to the benefit of priority. The court also emphasized that the
enjoyment of the priority should be determined objectively, based on
the disclosure of the foreign application at issue.195 Thus, the ‘766
patent enjoys the 1971 U.K. priority date. After confirming that
cimetidine was not known as of the 1971 priority date, the court
concluded that SKF could rely on article 104 presumption.
Article 104 shifts the burden to Fujimoto to rebut that its product
was produced by SKF’s patented process.196 The Tokyo District
Court viewed SKF’s evidence more reliable than Fujimoto’s
evidence. SKF’s evidence compared impurities included in the
patented and accused products and that both products were made by
the same process. In contrast, the court discounted the credibility of
the production records prepared by Fujimoto’s supplier and
concluded that Fujimoto’s product was produced by the ‘677 patent
process.197
After upholding Fujimoto’s liability, the court accepted most of
the plaintiffs’ arguments for determining damages. The court first
agreed with SKF that Fujimoto needed to pay a reasonable royalty to
SKF for its escape from paying a license royalty. It also agreed that
SBS was the exclusive licensee of the ‘677 patent and entitled to the
194. Id. at 64.
195. Id.
196. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1958, art. 104.
197. 1653 HANREI JIHÇ at 65.
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recovery of its lost profits. The court recognized that SKF sued 26
Japanese companies to enjoin their sales of cimetidine.198 It also
acknowledged the fact that SKF later settled with six of them and
included a promise not to sue for their future sales in exchange for
receiving compensation. In refusing to view the settlement as a grant
of licenses, the court explained that its reason was to avoid the
unreasonable result that an exclusive licensee would lose its right of
damage recovery once its patentee/licensor settled with a infringer.199
The court did not want to treat former illegal infringers the same as
legal licensees because otherwise, illegal infringers would benefit
from the acts of lawful exclusive licensees.
With respect to the amount of infringing product sold by
Fujimoto, the court accepted most of the plaintiff’s arguments
because Fujimoto refused to produce the accounting books necessary
to calculate the sales of the infringing product.200 The court also
discounted the credibility of the amount relied on by Fujimoto
because the amount in stock was extremely large compared with the
total amount of imported cimetidine powder. Instead, the court
calculated the amount of products sold by Fujimoto based on the total
imported amount with a discount of a five percent loss during the
process for converting powder into tablets.
In examining the recovery of SBS’s lost profits, the court agreed
that SBS lost sales of its patent product in same amount of infringing
product sold by Fujimoto.201 To calculate SBS’s lost profits, the court
calculated SBS’s own net profits on its own product. After deducting
direct costs (raw materials, license royalty fees, transportation, and
distribution costs) and general management fees (advertisement, sales
promotion cost, and contracting research cost), the court concluded
SBS’s net profits as 15%, 5.15 yen per tablet.202 Thus, the court
granted an award of lost profits by multiplying the net profits by the
amount of Fujimoto’s sales throughout the period between July 1990
and August 1993.
198. Id. at 66.
199. Id. at 67.
200. Id.
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The plaintiffs also claimed damages incurred after the expiration
date of the ‘677 patent. Their argument is based on the accelerated
reentry theory.203 According to the theory, Fujimoto could not have
entered the market for at least one year after the expiration date
because it would have needed at least one year to obtain approval
from the government to sell its generic version of the patented drug.
However, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, stating that the act
of filing for an approval itself does not give rise to infringement.204
The court also agreed with the plaintiffs that causation exists
between Fujimoto’s infringement and SBS’s lost sales. It rejected
Fujimoto’s argument because, although alternative products treating
similar diseases were available on the market, the infringing product
was exactly the same as the product resulting from the patented
process, and the efficacy and properties of other products argued as
alternative substitutes are different from those of the product made by
the patented process.205 The court also rejected Fujimoto’s other
arguments that its own market strategies resulted in sales of
infringing products, stating that there was not sufficient evidence to
support the arugment.206
Finally, with respect to SKF’s recovery of unjust enrichment, the
court agreed that Fujimoto escaped the payment of a reasonable
royalty to SKF to sell its infringing product. Between 5% relied on
the plaintiff and 2% to 4% relied on Fujimoto, citing the JPO’s
published royalty rates, the court adopted a 3.5% royalty but did not
give any reason why it adopted the rate.207 The royalty was applied to
the gross sales of infringing product. As a result, the Tokyo District
Court awarded a total 3059.36 M yen (lost profits: 2559.36 M yen;
unjust enrichment: 500.M yen; plus 5% statutory interests) to the
plaintiff.
203. Few United States district courts have adopted this theory. See, e.g., TP Orthodontics
Inc. v. Professional Positioners, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497, 1505-06 (E.D. Wis. 1990),
vacated in part, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1017 (E.D. Wis. 1991), aff’d, 980 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see
also Amsted Indus., Inc. v. National Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1754 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
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2. The Source of the New Direction: 1998 Patent Law Revision
a. The New Damages Provision May Have Introduced a
Presumption Making the Recovery of Lost Profits Easier
The Tokyo District Court’s attitude in Smithkline Cimetidine was
in stark contrast with the Osaka District Court in the Golf Cart
Monorail System Case. The former court simply rejected the
defendant’s argument, for a rejection of causation, as lacking
sufficient evidence while the latter rejected the patentee’s argument
on causation for the same reason. This significant change in the
attitude of Japanese courts is likely motivated by the change of policy
in measuring Japanese patent infringement damages via the 1998
Patent Law revision.208 Although Smithkline Cimetidine was decided
before the effective date of the 1998 Patent Law revision,209 the
analysis adopted by the Tokyo District Court, in calculating lost
profits, closely followed the new provision for calculating lost profits
and the JPO’s legislative intent.
For facilitating patentees to claim the recovery of lost profits and
reduce the burden to show causation,210 the JPO’s 1998 revision
added a provision that reads:
Where a patentee or exclusive licensee claims a recovery of
damages to a person who negligently or willfully infringes
patent right or exclusive license, provided that said person has
assigned products which constitute infringement to a third
party, said patentee or exclusive licensee, the patentee may
claim to recover damages equal to the amount of the profits per
unit of goods that would have been sold but for the
infringement multiplied by the number of said assigned goods
(hereinafter, “the number of assignment”) as long as the
amount does not extend to the ability to exploit the patented
invention of said patentee or exclusive licensee. However,
208. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988.
209. The 1998 revision took effect on January 1, 1999.
210. For the legislative intent explained by a JPO official, see Yasukazu Irino, Tokkyo Hou
Tou no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru Houritsu [A Law for Revising Part of Patent Law and Other
Industrial Property Laws], 1140 JURISTO 71 (1998).
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where circumstances indicate that said patentee or exclusive
licensee would have been unable to sell all or some of said
assigned goods, courts should deduct the unsold number from
the number of assignment.211
This provision is significant because it indicates the JPO’s effort
to increase the use of lost-profits damages to remedy Japanese
patents. For the first time, the option of lost profits is expressly for it
the patent statute. The new provision for lost profits was inserted in
paragraph one, and the existing provisions for defendant’s profits and
reasonable royalty were moved to paragraphs two and three,
respectively. The insertion of the new provision in the first paragraph
may be interpreted as announcing a change of policy in measuring
patent infringement damages in Japan. Moreover, under Japanese
rules of statutory construction, a general rule is normally followed by
exceptions to the general rule.212
This provision can be interpreted as establishing either a
presumption with the possibility of rebuttal, suitei, or a presumption
of no possibility of rebuttal, minashi.213 Reflecting the expected
changes in article 102, the Smithkline Cimetidine court might have
viewed this legislative development as creating a positive test for
claiming lost profits, and as effectively removing the heavy burden of
proof to establish causation. This view is clearly supported by the
legislative intent published by a JPO official.214 If the provision were
interpreted to provide conditions that gave rise to a presumption and
shifted the burden to an accused infringer, such interpretation would
make establishment of lost profits in Japanese courts even easier than
in United States courts. Literally interpreted, the new provision
requires a patentee to show only two of the Panduit four factors: (1)
the patentee’s capability to manufacture and sell; and (2) its own
profits and the number of infringing products.215 The burden then
211. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art 102, para.1 (author’s translation). 
212. NOBUTOSHI TAJIMA, HOUREI NO DOKUKAI HO [METHODOLOGIES FOR INTERPRETING
STATUTE] 109 (1980).
213. SANSHUSHA EDITION, HORITSU YOGO HAYAWAKARI JITEN [QUICK LEGAL TERM
DICTIONARY] 202 (1998).
214. For a general discussion on the legislative history of the 1998 Revision, see Irino,
supra note 210, at 71.
215. For the four factors of the Panduit test, see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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shifts to the infringer to show that the number of infringing products
should be reduced. Under Japanese civil procedure, a presumption
shifts not only the burden of going forward with evidence but also the
burden of persuasion.216
This means that the new provision does not require the most
controversial factor under United States case law, the existence of an
acceptable non-infringing substitute. For United States infringers, the
presence of an acceptable substitute is the best defense to prevent a
recovery of lost profits.217 The case law is not clear as to what degree
of similarity is necessary to meet the definition of acceptable
substitute, although many courts have applied a strict identity
standard.218 When courts find an acceptable substitute, patentees may
substitute the alternative substitute element with proof of the
patentee’s market share.219 However, the patentee may fail to show
causation because the patentee must show, with a reasonable
possibility, that it could have made the sales based on the market
share but for infringement.220 Furthermore, the case law is not clear
as to whether a patentee may recover lost profits if the patentee did
not choose to use its right exclusively but instead gave a license to a
competitor.221 Accordingly, removal of the acceptable substitute
factor deprives infringers of their only effective defense against
claims of lost profits.
The acceptable substitute has been the most effective defense for
Japanese infringers, as it negates causation and completely prevents a
216. HIDEYUKI KOBAYASHI, SHIN SHOUKO HOU [NEW EVIDENCE RULE] 168 (1998). The
effect of a presumption under U.S. law is to shift the burden of going forward with evidence
only. FED. R. EVID. 301. The Federal circuit’s Panduit test gives only an inference of causation.
An inference is distinguished from a presumption in J. W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 2.05[2] (2d ed. 1991).
217. A legal commentator cautioned the use of an acceptable substitute factor in the
Panduit Test in examining lost profits. See Allan Littman, Monopoly, Competition and Other
Factors in Determining Patent Infringement Damages, 38 IDEA 1 (1997).
218. See CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[1][b][v][E].
219. State Industries, 883 F.2d at 1473. For a general discussion of the market-share rule,
see Christopher Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits Damages, 26 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 747 (1994).
220. Bic Leisure Products, Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
221. See, e.g., Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 487 (1853); see also Irah Donner, Bic
Leisure v. Windsurfing: The Federal Circuit Catches the “Big One” and Leaves the Supreme
Court on Shore to Dry, 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 167 (1994).
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recovery of lost profits. Knowing the dreadful effect of the negative
test, the JPO intentionally removed the factor from the new provision
and lowered the barrier to recovery of lost profits.222 The JPO intends
that negative factors developed under the pre-1998 law, including the
presence of acceptable substitute, will function only to reduce the
amount determined in accordance with the first sentence of the
provision.223 Courts will reduce the amount established by the
patentee only when infringers can produce evidence that is sufficient
to show the presence of a substitute or any special circumstance that
prevents patentees from making infringing sales but for
infringement.224 The Smithkline court’s eagerness to calculate
damages based on the patentee’s net profits and the defendant’s sales
and reluctance to accept the defendant’s evidence to show the amount
that would not have been sold parallels the JPO’s legislative intent.
It is still arguable that the first sentence of the new paragraph one
imposes the burden to show causation on the patentee with respect to
the number of assigned goods that would have been sold but for
infringement.225 In other words, if this interpretation is adopted,
Japanese courts must reject a claim for recovery of lost profits, if the
patentee is unable to show the number of assignment. However, such
an interpretation directly conflicts with the JPO’s legislative intent.
The Smithkline Cimetidine court may have compensated the patentee
more than a United States court would have.
Following the sprit of the new provision, the Smithkline court very
likely compensated the patentee more than a United States court
would have compensated the patentee. If a United States court
decided SmithKline, the patentee should have overcome several
hurdles to recover lost profits for all the infringing products sold by
the accused infringer. First, United States courts would have found
acceptable non-infringing, alternative substitutes and thus the
patentee would not have been able to rely on the Panduit test to infer
causation. The Smithkline court simply denied the accused infringer’s
222. Irino, supra note 210, at 72.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art. 102, para. 1. For the author’s
translation, see supra note 211.
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argument that ranitidine sold as “Zantac” and famotidine sold as
“Gaster” were acceptable, non-infringing substitutes, stating that they
are not structurally the same as cimetidine and result in a different
pharmaceutical effect.226 The same argument, however, would have
likely persuaded a United States court to find an acceptable, non-
infringing substitute.
In cases involving Histamine 2 antagonist drug patents, United
States courts recognized the better pharmaceutical effects of
ranitidine and famotidine over cimetidine.227 They are particularly
keen to the exceptional market success of Zantac (ranitidine.)228 A
United States court’s due consideration to the entrance of generic
versions, cimetidine and ranitidine, into the market in examining the
commercial success of famotidine is in stark contrast to the
Smithkline court’s ignorance to the presence of ranitidine and
famotidine in the market when examining the sales of cimetidine.229
Although the similarity of the products sold by the infringer and
patentee is one of very few positive tests for causation under the pre-
1998 revision case law,230 the Smithkline court’s analysis focusing
only on the similarity ignores the realities of the market. If these
drugs have particular features that motivated consumers to purchase
them, and would have likely captured sales made by the infringer,
despite a difference in the drugs, the court should have denied
causation because the but for test is not met.231
Second, the presence of generic drug makers who produce
cimetidine by any process other than the patented process constitutes
a non-infringing, alternative substitute after the expiration of the
basic patent as long as the processes adopted by the generic
manufacturer possessed substantially all the functional advantages of
226. 1653 HANREI JIHÇ, at 69.
227. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). The court noted that ranitidine is three to eleven times more active than cimetidine and
famotidine is from twenty to thirty times more potent than cimetidine and does not exhibit the
side effects and safety hazards indicated by cimetidine. Id. at 373.
228. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Pharmadyne Corp., 32 F. Supp.2d 265, 269 (D. Md. 1998).
229. Id. at 374.
230. IIP DAMAGES REPORT, supra note 74, at 34.
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the patented process.232 The Smithkline court recognized that twenty-
six companies began to sell generic versions of cimetidine after the
expiration of the basic patent in 1992.233 Against the patentee’s claim
for infringing the process patent, five of the generic companies
agreed to pay money in exchange of allowing them to continue to sell
their products. However, the agreement did not clarify whether the
generic drug resulted from the patented process.
If the generic makers made cimetidine by a non-infringing
process, regardless of the agreements of the parties, the presence of
the drug after the expiration of the basic product patent would have
prevented the patentee from meeting but for causation under the
Panduit test. Thus, the court’s analysis would have focused on
whether the drugs were an infringing substitute. If the court found
that the drugs were being made by a non-infringing process, the drugs
should have constituted a non-infringing, acceptable substitute unless
the patentee can show that the non-infringing process adopted by the
generic drug makers was so inferior and thus not an acceptable,
alternative process.234 However, the Tokyo District Court did not
examine whether the generic makers’ drugs resulted from a patented
process and denied the defendant’s argument that SBS’s lost sales
resulted from the sales of these generic makers’ cimetidine.
Even if the generic drug makers’ cimetidine was resulted from the
patented process, the patentee’s settlement of third party generic drug
makers also resulted in non-infringing, alternative substitutes. In Pall
Corp. v. Micron Separations Inc., 235 the Federal Circuit resolved the
issue of how the patentee’s settlement with third-party infringers
affects the infringer-in-suit.236 Although the court allowed the
patentee to recover lost profits for all infringing sales before
settlement, the infringing sales after settlement were only allowed a
recovery of lost profits by the court. In respect to the patentee’s
market share, the court awarded a reasonable royalty for the third
party licensee’s market share. Interestingly, the Pall court clearly
232. CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[1][b][v][E].
233. 1653 HANREI JIHO at 66-67.
234. Central Soya Co., Inc. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
235. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
236. MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW, 1123 (1998).
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disagreed with the SmithKline court as to whether infringers were
allowed to benefit from the patentee’s settlement with other
infringers. The Pall court rejected the patentee’s argument to prevent
infringers from benefiting from the settlement by noting that
“injustice is inevitable, for the setting of the royalty rate and the
discretion to multiply damages can assist in achieving a just
remedy.”237 Thus, had a United States court decided SmithKline, the
patentee would have needed to show its market share and would only
recover lost profits for part of the infringer’s sales. However, in the
Tokyo District Court, the patentee avoided production of extensive
evidence of market share and obtained a full recovery of lost profits.
If SmithKline is viewed to properly reflect the interpretation of the
new provision, negative tests will no longer remain to cut causation
completely. The negative tests from the pre-1998 revision case law
will function only to reduce the number shown by the patentee.
However, as the Smithkline court’s reluctance to accept the presence
of an alternative substitute clearly indicates, it will be difficult to
persuade Japanese courts to find sufficient evidence of such reduction
factors. This may result in a test even more effective than the United
States courts’ Panduit test for enabling recovery of lost profits.
B. Japanese Courts Increased Interest in Patent Litigation
Another source of new direction expressed in the Smithkline
Cimetidine case is Japanese courts’ increased interests in patent
infringement. In the past, Japanese courts paid very little attention to
intellectual property infringement litigation because the number of
actions brought to Japanese courts were very low.238 The complexity
of technology inherently involved in intellectual property legal issues
naturally kept the courts at distance from intellectual property
litigation. Although Japanese courts created special divisions to deal
with IP cases in the Tokyo and Osaka District Courts and High
Courts, Japanese judges were required to move one court to another
237. Pall Corp., 66 F.3d at 1223.
238. Mitsuyoshi Mochizuki, Litigation Proceedings for Intellectual Property Cases, 5
INST. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. BULL. 77 (1996). Intellectual property cases accounted for only
0.3% of all civil actions between 1990 and 1994.
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every two to three years.239 This rotation system was introduced to
avoid Judges’ bias and corruption within the local community but
prevented Japanese judges from developing expertise.
However, the JPO’s campaign on pro-patent policy changed
Japanese courts’ attitudes toward patent and intellectual property
litigation. To attract the courts’ attention, the JPO published a series
of reports on patent enforcement procedure in Japanese courts. An
investigative report sponsored by the JPO compared the pending
periods necessary for cases involving intellectual property disputes
and those for all civil cases and emphasized a significant delay in the
former cases.240 The report also pointed out problems in procedure
under the pre-1996 Civil Procedure. Another report highlighted the
difficulty in receiving compensation of damages in the form of lost
profits and revealed that most damages awarded by Japanese courts
are as low as a legally negotiated royalty.241 These reports resulted in
an industry-wide discussion reviewing remedies for patent
infringement.
Coincidentally, Japanese courts were undertaking a major revision
of civil procedure.242 Responding to criticisms from the patent
community, Japanese courts extensively changed provisions relating
to the courts’ jurisdiction over cases involving intellectual
property.243 To remedy the lack of expertise problem, the 1996 Civil
Procedure Law introduced a centralized system where courts can
transfer patent and intellectual property cases to either the Osaka or
Tokyo District Court, by request of the parties or on their
discretion.244 This means that most IP cases are then reviewed by
judges in the IP special division at either the Osaka or Tokyo High
Court. A Joukoku appeal from these courts are reviewed by the
Supreme Court, where IP specialist judges serve as research
239. For a general discussion of a Japanese judge’s career path, see Michael K. Young &
Constance C. Hamilton, Introduction to Japanese Law, in LAW AND INVESTMENT IN JAPAN 63
(Yanagida et. al., eds., 1995).
240. Mochizuki, supra note 238, at 78.
241. IIP DAMAGES, supra note 74, at 39.
242. See generally MINSOHÇ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996.
243. For a general discussion of the changes in patent litigation practice after the revision,
see Ryu Takayanagi, Practices of Patent Litigation in Japanese Courts, 5-2 CASRIP NEWSL.
13 (1998) available at <http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/newsletter/ newsv5i2jp2.html>.
244. MINSOHÇ [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 109 of 1996, art. 6.
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associates, Chosakan, to assist Supreme Court Justices.245
The serious effort of Japanese courts to remedy these problems
are clear from the significant increase in the number of judges
appointed to special IP divisions. After the increase in judges, the
Tokyo District Court now encompasses three special divisions,
including three panels exclusively working on IP cases, and the
Osaka District Court has one special division with one panel.246 To
deal with appeals from the Tokyo District Court and decisions of the
Japanese Patent Office’s Board of Appeals, the Tokyo High Court
has one special division comprising three sections. The Osaka High
Court has one “concentration” division that deals with IP cases and
other complex cases in the Osaka High Court since the Osaka High
Court only hears appeals from Osaka District Court.
Despite efforts of Japanese courts, the JPO was not satisfied. After
the 1996 Civil Procedure revision, the JPO published a report and
widely requested submission of comments on the current patent
enforcement procedure.247 In this report, the JPO pointed out a
significant increase in the number of IP cases, compared with the
total civil actions, and emphasized the increased significance in
giving quick, efficient remedies for IP infringement. The report
focused on insufficient remedies given by Japanese courts as
highlighting the huge difference between damages awarded by
Japanese and United States courts and a significant delay in disposing
of IP cases.248 The report looked into patent court systems in the
United States, Germany, and United Kingdom and proposed to
consider the possibility of creating a special patent court to remedy
the lack of expertise.249 Furthermore, as a part of 1999 Patent Law
revision, the JPO enhanced the Hantei system, a trial for determining
the technical scope of a claim, to give the JPO’s view on the claim
245. See Young & Hamilton, supra note 239, at 66.
246. For a general discussion of the court system, see Setsuko Asami, Japan-U.S. Patent
Infringement Litigation Practice: A Visit to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 5-3 CASRIP NEWSL. 9 (1998) available at <http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/
newsletter/newsv5i3asami.html>.
247. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHT COMMITTEE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, TOKKYO HOU
TOU NO KAISEI NI KANSURU TOUSHIN [INVITITATION OF COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL FOR
REVISING PATENT LAW AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS] (1997).
248. Id. at 38-39.
249. Id. at 128.
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interpretation so that parties of patent disputes can take advantage of
an inexpensive, quick dispute resolution system within the JPO.250
To show their ability to deal with IP cases in the current system,
Japanese courts began to dispatch their judges to study patent
litigation in leading countries.251 One main reason for sending Judges
is to learn proceedings to dispose patent and other IP cases quickly
and effectively. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Japan set up a
special project team to reduce the delay in patent litigation.252 Such
an effort to give a quick, effective relief for infringement has resulted
in a quick injunction against “e-One” computer given by the Tokyo
District Court.253 In short, Japanese courts have become a target of
criticism from Japanese industry for its inability to grant quick,
effective relief for IP infringement. The necessity of exhibiting their
competence may have motivated the Smithkline court to grant
exceptionally large damages for the patentee.
III: WILL INCREASED DAMAGES HELP THE RECOVERY OF JAPAN’S
ECONOMY FROM ITS LONG STANDING RECESSION?
A. Increased Damages
1. More Frequent Awards Of Lost Profits
The new provision gives courts a lot of room to interpret the
language and the power to balance the interests of patentees and
competitiors through case-by-case application. Because the
Smithkline Cimetidine case is a district court case and an appeal has
been filed with the Tokyo High Court, it is too early to decide its
250. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 41 of 1999, art. 71.
251. ASAHI SHINBUN, LEARN ABOUT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION FROM FOREIGN
COUNTRIES (1999).
252. NIKKEI SHINBUN, ACCELERATION OF PATENT LITIGATION PROCEEDING (1999).
253. Unpublished order (Tokyo ChihÇ Saibansho 1999) (Apple Computer filed an action in
the Tokyo District Court based on unfair competition claim on August 24, 1999. After less than
one month, the court granted a preliminary injunction against the accused infringer). A
summary of this case is published in Toshiko Takenaka, Quick and Effective IP Enforcement in
Japanese Courts, 6-2 CASRIP NEWSL. 4 (1999), available at <http://www.law.washington.
edu/casrip/newsletter/newshome.html>.
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significance.254 It should be noted, however, that the panel deciding
the case included the most senior patent judge255 in the IP special
division of the Tokyo District Court, the biggest patent division of all
Japanese district courts. Further, the judgement was widely reported
both nationally and internationally.256 Thus, other courts may view
the decision as a leading case to show the impact of 1998 revision,
and may follow the interpretation in upholding the lost profit damage
awards.
One possible result of the new damage provision is that the
positive test may have removed the requirement that the patentee
exploit the patented invention and further increased the chance to
claim damages in the form of profits. In the Smithkline Cimetidine
case, the defendant argued that whether the patentee’s product
resulted from the patented process was not clear and thus the patentee
did not meet the exploitation requirement for claiming lost profits.257
However, the court’s analysis only focused on whether the
defendant’s product resulted from the patented process but did not
examine whether the patentee exploited the patented process. This is
in stark contrast with the Golf Cart case where the lost profits damage
analysis began with an examination of whether the patentee itself has
exploited the invention.
The fact that the Smithkline Cimetidine court paid little attention
to the patentee’s exploitation can be viewed as directly following the
JPO’s legislative intent in the 1998 Patent Law revision. In
considering the revision, the JPO emphasized the need to remove the
requirement and proposed possible provisions to enable courts to
award lost profits even if the patentee does not exploit the patented
invention.258 The new provision actually adopted by the JPO states
that  only a patentee can recover the profits for products the patentee
254. For a general discussion of the role of judicial precedents in Japanese legal system,
see HIDEO TANAKA, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM § 5 (1984).
255. Judge Toshiaki Iimura is the head of the 29th IP special division and the most senior
judge among all judges appointed to the three IP special divisions in Tokyo District Court.
256. SmithKline Wins Three Billion Yen  Lawsuit, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998.
257. 1653 HANREI JIHÇ at 59-60.
258. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE FOR REVIEWING DAMAGES,
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would have sold but for the infringement.259 It does not expressly
require that those products, sold or made by the patentee, embody the
patent-in-suit.260 However, the old provision did not expressly
provide such requirement either.261 Instead, Japanese courts, through
their case law, developed the requirement.262 Thus, it will be up to
Japanese courts to decide whether they will interpret the silence on
that requirement as the legislature’s acquiescence to their current law.
In other words, by not providing specific instructions, the legislature
has given Japanese judges the opportunity to develop a new policy
with respect to how extensively courts should allow patentees to
recover lost profits of their products, even if the patented invention
was not embodied in such products.
The elimination of the inventor’s exploitation requirement may
lead to a significant increase in the awarding of lost profit damages,
which started an extensive debate in the United States patent
community.263 A review of United States cases reveals a variety of
circumstances where courts have awarded lost profits to patentees
even though none of the patentees’ products embodied the patents-in-
suit. Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co.,264 a United States case, is an
example of circumstances where Japanese courts might feel
comfortable about allowing a recovery of lost profits without
requiring the patentee to market the patented invention. In Scripto-
Tokai, the patentee had two patents on different erasable ink
technologies. The patentee manufactured and sold pens using one of
the technologies and the defendant infringed the patent, which
covered the other technology that the patentee had never
commercialized. The District Court for the Central District of
California rejected the alleged infringer’s argument that the patentee
had not marketed the product covered by the patent-in-suit.
259. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art 102, para. 1. For the translation of
the new provision by the author, see supra note 211.
260. Id.
261. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art 102.
262. MASUI & TAMURA, supra note 75, at 277.
263. In King, the late Judge Nies wrote a lengthy opinion, disagreeing with the elimination
of the requirement. King, 65 F.3d at 953 (Nies, C.J., dissenting). See also Jonathan Spivey,
King Instuments Corporation v. Perego: Conflict in the Awarding Patent Damages, 21 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 369 (1996).
264. 788 F. Supp. 439 (C.D. Calif. 1992.)
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Distinguishing the Federal Circuit cases relied upon by the infringer,
the court concluded that a patentee should be given an opportunity to
show lost profits with a reasonable probability where the patentee
markets a product directly competing with the infringing product.
Another example involving a patented invention that was not
marketed by the patentee is Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal
Equipment Innovation, a case where the patent-in-suit related to a
gas-injection apparatus.265 The patentee did not market the entire
apparatus but manufactured and sold a pump specially made for the
apparatus. Although the pump was an element of the claims in the
patent-in-suit, none of the claims covered the pump itself. As for the
defendant’s sales of a similar pump, the court upheld a claim of
contributory infringement and awarded lost profits for the sale of the
pump as well as its spare parts. Here, the patentee only partially
exploited the invention. The court, however, allowed the patentee to
recovery for the lost sale of the patentee’s product, which was a non-
patented element of the patented invention, because of the direct
competition between the patentee’s product and the defendant’s
product.
Returning to our first example, King,266 the patentee’s single-reel
tape loader did not use the reel changer, which included the splicing
assembly that infringed the patent-in-suit. The Federal Circuit,
nevertheless, awarded lost profits for the sales of the single-reel tape
loader because it directly competed with the defendant’s double-
pancake loader that embodied the reel changer covered by the patent-
in-suit. With respect to only the patented and infringed part, the
splicing assembly in the reel changer, the patentee did not produce a
competing product. However, the majority viewed the entire
magnetic-tape loader as being the reel changer part of the machine,
and awarded lost profits for the entire machine, relying upon the fact
that the patentee’s loader directly competed with the defendant’s
loader. In King, the patentee did not market the reel changer.
Additionally, whether the defendant’s and the patentee’s loaders were
competing products was questionable because the patentee’s loader
did not include the reel changer. In circumstances like King, Japanese
265. 72 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
266. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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courts may be more reluctant to award lost profits than in a case
dealing directly with a competing substitute, as discussed in Scripto-
Tokai.267
In short, Japanese courts have a long-standing practice of
automatically rejecting lost profit claims as soon as they find that the
patentee does not market any products embodying the patented
invention at issue. Thus, they did not need to deal with the variety of
complex economic circumstances surrounding the patented product
in the market. Once they discard this practice, Japanese courts will
need to start examining all of these complexities. However, it is
doubtful that they are ready to deal with these issues. Even the
Federal Circuit has not been able to set a clear line as to how far a
patentee can recover for lost sales of products which do not embody
any of patented invention at issue.268
2. Expansion of Damage Scope
Another area where Japanese courts have been given room to
increase damages is in deciding whether to adopt the entire-market-
value rule, and thereby avoid complex apportionment issues. 269 The
new provision does not expressly deal with this issue either.270
However, one can interpret the language of the provision as shifting
any burden, for reducing the amount shown by the patentee, to the
defendant, including the fact that the patented invention only partially
contributes to the sale of the entire market. In fact, for United States
practitioners who are familiar with the historical developments of the
doctrine of apportionment in United States courts, the Smithkline
Cimetidine case can be viewed as a case applying the entire-market-
value rule.
In Smithkline, the Tokyo District Court allowed the recovery of
profits for the entire product during the period of the accused
267. 788 F. Supp. at 439.
268. Toshiko Takenaka, Patent Infringement Damages after Rite-Hite, 4-1 CASRIP
NEWSL. 4 (1997) available at <http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/newsletter/
newsv4i1us2.html>.
269. See supra Part I.
270. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art 102, para. 1. For the translation of
the new provision by the author, see supra note 211.
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infringer’s sales of its product, including the period after the
expiration of the basic patent covering cimetidine.271 As an
apportionment issue, United States courts have dealt with the
question of whether a patentee can recover for lost sales of products
after the expiration of a product patent based on a surviving
process.272 This is because the contribution of the patent at issue was
only the process of making a product, but not for the product, which
had already been placed in the public domain. However, the
development of the entire-market-value rule and the Panduit test
made it possible for United States patentees to recover lost profits
measured by sales of products made by the process even if the patent
covering the product had expired.273
Although the Smithkline court’s award of lost profits for the entire
product was not motivated by the new provision, legal commentators
had suggested allowing recovery for lost sales based on the entire-
market-value rule, if the patentee established that the patented part
produced the demand for the entire product.274 This was not an
extreme view because even before the 1998 revision Japanese courts,
in exceptional cases, allowed recovery for an entire product based on
a patent only partially covering the product.275 The same theory may
be applicable to extending recovery for the lost sales of non-patented
spare parts, accessories, and convoyed goods.276
As clearly shown in the King case, the Federal Circuit’s analysis
in recent decisions can be viewed as shifting the burden to the
infringer to prevent the application of the market-value test.277 This
practice is very controversial, introducing an unclear limit for the
271. 1653 HANREI JIHÇ at 67-69.
272. CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[1][v]. For the issues relating to “apportionment”
under the old infringer profit measure of recovery, see id..§ 20.02[4][a].
273. State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 725 (1990); Central Soya Co., Inc. v. Geo A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
274. MASUI & TAMURA, supra note 75, at 295.
275. Ando Card Kogyo v. Itoki Shoten, 154 HANREI TAIMUZU 150 (Tokyo Chiho
Saibansho 1964). In this case, the disputed patent related to an envelope for storing documents.
However, the lost profits were measured by the price of card storage device in which the
patented envelope was installed.
276. CHISUM, supra note 40, § 20.03[1][c][iv].
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scope of recovery.278 However, Japanese courts may follow this
recent trend in the Federal Circuit and interpret the new provision so
that the apportionment of patented and non-patented parts constitutes
“special conditions” in the second sentence of the revised law.279
Because the second sentence is a provisory clause, the burden of
showing such conditions is on the infringers, instead of the
patentees.280 Such interpretation not only makes the recovery of lost
profits easy, by eliminating apportionment issues, but also expands
the scope of damages that are recoverable as lost profits.
B. Increase in Reasonable Royalty
In addition to these significant increases in the calculation of lost
profits, the JPO’s revision also includes a change in the provision for
calculating damages in the form of a reasonable royalty.281 The new
provision removed the term “ordinarily” from the definition of the
amount received as damages in the form of a royalty.282 Elimination
of this term was designed to allow Japanese courts to take into
account the circumstances of a particular case and grant a royalty
higher than that available under the published industry standard rates
or the JPO license rates for government-owned patents.283 The policy
behind this revision was that infringers should not be able to profit
from their infringing acts by obtaining a license without making
efforts to do so legally.284 Reflecting this policy, Japanese courts may
step outside the nondiscriminatory model of the legal licensee and
infringer in order to grant a royalty higher than the published royalty.
278. Lisa Childs, Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.: The Federal Circuit Awards Damages for
Harm Done to a Patent not in Suit, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 665 (1996).
279. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art. 102, para. 1. For the author’s
translation, see supra note 211.
280. SHINDOU KOUJI, SHIN MINJI SOSHOU HOU [NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 498
(1998).
281. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art 102, para. 3.
282. Id. art 102, para. 2.
283. Irino, supra note 127, at 72.
284. Id.
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C. Impact on Japanese Economy
1. Risks of Overcompensation
The new damages provision may have created a scheme for
consistently awarding damages exceeding the actual damages
because Japanese courts may not develop a set of factors to reduce
the amount calculated by the patentee according to the format in the
first sentence of the new provision.285 The second sentence of the new
provision makes clear that infringers can rebut the amount
established by the patentee if the infringer can show special
conditions that would have prevented the patentee from selling its
own product even without infringement.286 However, because the
second sentence is a provisory provision, the burden is on the
defendant to show such a special condition and the amount that the
patentee was prevented from selling.287
The pre-1998 law clearly indicates the difficulty faced by the
patentee when trying to meet the burden of showing the number of
products affected by infringement.288 To recover lost profits, a
showing of the sales affected by the infringer’s sales was not
sufficient.289 The patentee needed to show how much of the
infringing sales would have gone to the patentee but for the
infringement.290 The new article 102, paragraph one, may simply shift
this difficult burden with respect to reduction of the amount of
damages shown by the patentee. Thus, the same burden may also
prevent infringers from showing causation between the special
conditions and the scope of sales that otherwise would not have been
sold by the patentee because of the conditions.
The difficulty of showing such special conditions is clearly
indicated by the Smithkline Cimetidine court’s refusal to consider
arguments advanced by Fujimoto. These arguments include the
285. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art. 102, para. 1. For the author’s
translation, see supra note 211.
286. Id
287. SHINDOU KOUJI, SHIN MINJI SOSHOU HOU [NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 498 (1998).
288. See supra Part I.
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presence of a non-infringing acceptable alternative, which functioned
to prevent the recovery of lost profits completely under the pre-1998
damage provision.291 Even under the new damage provision, the
arguments should have functioned to reduce the number of assigned
goods the patentee would have sold292 because some infringing sales
should have gone to licensed generic cimetidine, Zantac or Gaster.
Under the Federal Circuit case law, these factors either function to
reject the recovery of lost profits or, at least, to the reduction of lost
profits by the market share.293 However, the court avoided assessing
the amount affected by the presence of these alternatives and refused
to discount the amount shown by the patentee. If Japanese courts
continue this practice, the infringer will be unable to establish the
amount of any reduction because of the courts’ refusal to develop
measurements for assessments that exceed the actual damages
suffered by the patentee.
In common law countries, several justifications for compensation
exceeding actual damages are available.294 In civil law countries,
such as Japan, compensation exceeding the actual damages conflicts
with both the purpose of damages under the general tort policy and
with a Supreme Court decision.295 Thus, if Japanese courts do not
develop a practice for reducing the infringer’s burden to show the
amount of reduction, the overcompensation scheme created by the
new damage provision will be incongruous with provisions dealing
with other tort damages. This will, in turn, introduce significant
confusion into the general tort theory of Japanese law.
Japanese legal commentators have emphasized the unique features
of intellectual property, being intangible and difficult to protect from
infringement, and they have justified the overcompensation scheme
as a means of deterring future infringement and even punishing those
291. See supra Part II.
292. Irino, supra note 210, at 72.
293. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
294. United States courts may award non-compensatory damages for (1) funding attorney
fees for the plaintiff; (2) providing a sense of public sympathy for an injured person and (3) for
providing incentives by adjudicating particular cases, DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, 211-12
(2d ed. 1993). With respect to punitive damages, the amount exceeding the actual damages
serves both functions of deterrent and punishment. Id. at 322-27.
295. John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune— Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and
Patent Infringement in Japan, 4 INT’L LEGAL STUD. 1 (1988).
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who have infringed.296 However, as properly noted by a late Federal
Circuit judge, whether the increased damages operate to deter
infringement is doubtful where infringers are innocent, those who
began marketing the invention without any knowledge of the patent
alleged to be infringed.297 Further, if the overcompensation scheme is
justified by the policy of deterrence, the applicability of the new
provision must be limited to those who willfully infringed patents.298
For innocent infringers, one can argue that courts may resort to the
provision for reducing the amount of damages exceeding the amount
that would be assessed as a reasonable royalty.299 However, after the
JPO’s very effective campaign for a pro-patent policy and emphasis
on the insufficiency of compensation by a reasonable royalty, it is
very likely that courts will rely on the provision less frequently than
they did under the pre-1998 damage provision.
The possibility of increased damages may be viewed as a sword of
Damocles hanging over competitors with unpatented goods and may
serve as a powerful means for extortion.300 Such powerful patent
protection may discourage “design around” activities, which the
patent system always wants to encourage.301 Particularly, an award of
lost profits without the exploitation requirement encourages the
patentee to keep patented products out of the market,302 and would
conflict with the goal of Japanese patent law: the encouragement of
industrial developments through the disclosure and utilization of the
invention.303 This may also hinder the JPO’s mission to increase the
296. Kaoru Kamata et al., Zadankai: Tokkyoho no Kaisei to Konngo no Doukou [Revision
of Patent Law and Future Developments], 1162 Jurisuto 8 (1999).
297. King, 65 F.3d at 959 (Nies, J., dissenting).
298. Art. 102, para. 1 is applicable both to willful and innocent infringement.
299. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 51 of 1988, art 102, para. 4.
300. King, 65 F.3d at 959 (Nies, J., dissenting).
301. Westvaco Corp. v. International Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
302. The late Judge Nies argued that the grant of patent is made upon the reasonable
expectation that the patentee will either put his invention to practical use or permit others to do
so. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1562-63 (Nies, J., dissenting). Some legal commentators noted a
negative impact resulting from the removal of exploitation requirement. See Brent Rabowsky,
Recovery of Lost Profits on Unpatented Products in Patent Infringement Cases, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 281 (1996); Arun Chandra, Note, King Instruments Corp. v. Perego: Should Lost Profits
Be Awarded on Unpatented Products where Patentee Sits on Its Patents? 16 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 635 (1998).
303. Tokkyo Ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1958, art. 1.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol2/iss1/11
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proportion of patented inventions actually exploited by the
patentee.304 A close examination of United States case law reveals the
possibility of forcing innocent infringers into bankruptcy,305 which
may worsen what is already the worst unemployment rate in Japanese
history.306 In addition, the high risk of litigation and award of
damages will very likely force Japanese patentees to raise the price of
their products, which may further dampen the sluggish consumer
demand in the current Japanese market.307
Finally, increased damage awards may encourage unnecessary
litigation, which will lead to significant delays in the judicial
process.308 Because Japanese courts do not need to decide the
invalidity issue309 and have full power to decide the infringement
issue,310 Japanese courts are in a better position to decide the liability
issue more quickly than United States courts. However, unlike the
automatic rejection practice under pre-1998 law, the new damage
provision requires Japanese courts to make case-by-case
determinations whether infringement resulted in lost profits and to
address the complex issues in assessing lost profits on a more
frequent basis. This will also increase the time necessary to dispose
304. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHT COMMITTEE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SPECIAL
SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE , CHITEKI ZAISAN SENMON SABISU
SHOIINNKAI HOUKOKUSHO [A REPORT FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SPECIAL SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE] 10 (1999).
304. INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BEIKOKU PURO PATENTO SEISAKU NO
KENSHO [INVESTIGATION OF U.S. PRO-PATENT POLICY] (1999), reprinted in Yoshitake Kihara,
Beikoku Puro Patento Seisaku no Kensho [INVESTIGATION OF U.S. PRO-PATENT POLICY] 39
INST. OF INTELL. PROP. F. 2 (1999) [hereinafter PRO-PATENT REPORT].
305. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1562-63 (Nies, J., dissenting).
306. Stable Employment at May Day Rallies, JIJI PRESS TICKER SERVICE, May 1, 1999.
307. Economy & Politics, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Jan. 31, 2000, at 4.
308. Robert Cox, But How Far?: Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co.’s Expansion of the Scope of
Patent Damages, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 327 (1996).
309. According to case law, the Japanese Patent Office has exclusive jurisdiction over the
validity issue. There are two lines of cases that explain the rejection of courts’ jurisdiction over
the validity of issues. One line of cases rejects courts’ power because courts do not have power
to issue a decision extending to third parties. See Soshiete De Yujinnu Shimiku Rohn Puran v.
Yoshitomi Seiyaku Kawamoto v. Shinobe Seisakusho et al., 162 HANREI JIHÇ 23 (Osaka KÇtÇ
Saibansho 1958). Another line of cases rejects courts because they are refrained from invading
power exclusive to the Japanese Patent Office in deciding the fate of a patent, so as to maintain
the separation of jurisdiction between the patent office, an administrative branch, and courts,
the judicial branch. 543 HANREI TAIMUZU 263 (Osaka KÇtÇ Saibansho 1984).
310. Japanese courts do not use jury trials and thus have full power to decide both issues of
fact and law.
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patent cases, which may hinder the efforts by Japanese courts to
accelerate the proceeding and shorten the time spent for disposal.311
Since a quick injunction is what patent owners usually want and is
what prevents extensive damages over the extended period of
litigation, the efforts of the Japanese courts should concentrate on the
examination of liability, rather than the calculation of damages.312
2. Overcompensation May Encourage Investment for Technology
and Create New Businesses
Despite of the disadvantage and risks that may result from the
overcompensation scheme, the increased damage awards may
encourage investment in technology and assist in the establishment of
start-ups and spin-offs based on their new technology. A research
institute sponsored by the JPO conducted a series of interviews with
United States leaders in the intellectual property law community and
published a report, concluding that the patent system played an
important role in the recovery of the United States economy from the
recession in the 1970s.313
According to the report, the change in United States patent policy
was symbolized by the creation of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and the improvement of organization and
procedures in United States Patent and Trademark Office.314 Many
interviewees pointed out that the pro-patent policy increased
incentives to invest in research and development, which led to the
creation of new technology-based industries in the United States.315
Particularly, many noted the significant impact on the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industries that resulted from Chakrabarty,316 a
Supreme Court decision affirming the expansive scope of patentable
subject matter.317 Some praised the enactment of the Bayh-Dole
311. See supra Part III.B.2.
312. Eiji Katayama, Zadankai: Puro Patento no Jidai wo Mukaete [Panel Discussions:
Entering Pro-Patent Era], 38 INST. OF INTELL. PROP. F.  2, 10 (1999).
313. PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 2.
314. Id. at 9.
315. See, e.g., Michael Kirk, PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 27.
316. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
317. Gerald Mossinnghoff, PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 55.
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Act,318 which encouraged the transfer of publicly funded research
results to industry.319 Others noted that strong patent protection made
it easy for technology-based startup companies to raise capital from
the stock market.320 Many agreed that the United States patent system
favors technology-based startups, particularly individual inventors
because of the jury system and the first-to-invent system.321 Notably,
one interviewee commented that these startups hire workers laid off
by big companies and significantly contributed to the current low
unemployment rate in the United States.322
These comments from the interviewees support the premise that
the JPO’s pro-patent policy contributed to MITI’s important mission,
to aid the recovery of Japan’s economy from its long recession,
through the development of new industries and businesses to create
new jobs.323 MITI enacted legislation comparable to the Bayh-Dole
Act, which grants universities funds to establish technology-licensing
offices. Through licenses, MITI intents to increase exploitation of
inventions developed by universities and promote creation of
technology-based start-ups and spin-offs.324 Additionally, MITI
introduced several measures to encourage entrepreneurs to establish
technology-based startup companies.325 Such measures include
sponsoring seminars to train entrepreneurs, loans from public funds,
and tax exemption for research and development costs.326
Further, the potential for increased damages may, in particular,
contribute to the development of technology-based startups. Long
delays in enforcement and limited monetary recovery of infringement
damages led United States companies to view the value of Japanese
patents as less than United States patents.327 An increase in damages
318. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994).
319. Egils Milbergs, PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 163.
320. Bruce Lehman, PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 45. Harold Wegner, PRO-
PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 107.
321. Joseph Degrandi, PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 132.
322. Id. at 135.
323. Kaoru Yosano, Japan’s Challenge Toward 21st Century, available at
<http://www.miti.go.jp/topic-e/e-menu-e.html>.
324. HISAMITSU ARAI, TOKKYO SENRYAKU JIDAI [ERA OF PATENT STRATEGIES] 150
(1999).
325. See <http://www.miti.go.jp/topic-j/e-menu-j.html.> (last visited Nov. 26, 1999).
326. Id.
327. Daigaku Tou Gijutsu Iten Sokushin Ho [Law for Promoting Technology Transfer
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resulting from the new damage provision, along with quick
enforcement by Japanese courts, may increase the value of Japanese
patents, which will make it easier for start-up companies to raise
capital through the stock market and through licenses for its
technologies.
Finally, the potential for increased damages also creates more job
opportunities for lawyers and patent attorneys because it will give
Japanese patentees more incentive to sue and increase the number of
cases brought to Japanese courts. The promotion of technology
transfer will also increase the need for license specialists.328 Despite
the significant increase in need expected for patent specialists, only
lawyers, bengoshi, are qualified to engage in both litigation and
licensing under the Japanese Bengoshi law.329 However, only very
few lawyers have a scientific background and are interested in
intellectual property law.330 Patent attorneys, benrishi, are only
qualified to represent clients before the patent office and courts with
respect to the patentability and validity issues, although the majority
of patent attorneys have a scientific background and have experience
dealing with technologies.331 To represent clients with respect to
infringement issues, they must jointly represent clients with
lawyers.332 To provide sufficient legal assistance to university
technology licensing offices and to technology-based startups, the
JPO is considering revisions to the law for patent attorneys, benrishi,
to expand the scope of patent attorneys permissible duties.333 If the
JPO’s proposal becomes law, patent attorneys will be qualified to
from Universities], Law No. 52 of 1998; Sangyou Kassei Saisei Tokubetu Sochiho [Special
Provisions for Recovery of Active Industry: Japanese Bayh Dole Act], Law No. 131 of 1999.
328. In Japan, private companies and government agencies handle a large portion of their
legal work, including licensing and patent prosecution through law graduates not admitted to
the bar. For a general discussion of the legal profession in Japan, see HIDEO TANAKA, THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 550 (1984).
329. Bengoshi Ho [Law for Attorneys], Law No. 105 of 1949, § 72.
330. For the qualification and legal education of Japanese lawyers, see HIDEO TANAKA,
THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, 566 (1984).
331. HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 564 (1984)
332. Benrishi Ho [Patent Attorney Law], Law No. 100 of 1999, art. 9.
333. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHT COMMITTEE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SPECIAL
SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE , CHITEKI ZAISAN SENMON SABISU
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participate in license negotiations.
In short, MITI and the JPO expect the adoption of pro-patent
policies, including increased damages, will promote the creation of
technology-based business opportunities, and will lead to the revival
of the Japanese economy. In their attempts to revive Japan from its
long standing recession, MITI and the JPO imported a variety of
measures for encouraging innovation that were implemented by the
United States government in the 1970s and 1980s. However, because
of significant differences in the culture and business environment
between Japan and the United States, the measures that successfully
contributed to the recovery of the United States economy may not
work in Japan.334 Furthermore, there is no evidence that such
measures actually played an important role because the recovery
might have resulted from simple luck.335 All interviewees of the Pro-
Patent Report agreed that there were other, more significant factors,
including the cost reduction of United States industry and efficient
use of human resources.336
Recently the pro-patent case law developed by the Federal Circuit
has been a target for criticism by United States legal scholars.337
Responding to these criticisms, the Federal Circuit began to change
their own case law on claim interpretation and the doctrine of
equivalents to reevaluate the balance of conflicting interests between
the patentee and the public.338 Thus, the Federal Circuit might
reevaluate the case law on damages that the JPO adopted for the new
provision.339 In any case, it is too soon to decide whether the JPO’s
334. Egils Milbergs, PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 168. United States leaders
debated to adopt the industrial policy adopted by Japan’s MITI but decided to adopt a different
approach, which led to a current success.
335. Martin Adelman, PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 81.
336. PRO-PATENT REPORT, supra note 304, at 10.
337. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 684-740 (3d ed.
1994); Donald R. Dunner et al., A Statistical Look at the Federal Circuit's Patent Decisions:
1982-1994, 5 Fed. Cir. B.J. 151, 155 (1995); Allan Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our
Patent System, 37 IDEA 545 (1997).
338. Toshiko Takenaka, Harmonizing the Japanese Patent System with Its U.S.
Counterpart Through Judge-Made Law: Interaction between Japanese and U.S. Case Law
Developments, 7 PAC. RIM L. &  POL’Y J. 249 (1998).
339. Honorable Randall Rader, Remarks at the Seminar Sponsored by Kyoto Comparative
Center (May 17, 1998) (emphasizing that the Federal Circuit would not grant damages which
will not rely on a proper economic theory).
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pro-patent policy and increased damages, in fact, will contribute to
the recovery of the Japanese economy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The JPO’s call for changes in Japanese patent infringement
damages was successful in triggering debate in the patent community
and in drawing the courts’ attention to the new direction in patent
policy. The revision of the patent statute signifies the new direction
that the Japanese courts are very likely to follow and create an
overcompensation scheme to deter future infringement. To maintain
the traditional role of damages under the Japanese tort system and to
prevent overcompensation, Japanese courts will need measures to
reduce the infringer’s burden to establish the amount that would not
have sold even without infringement. However, such measurement
will not be readily developed and may take some time, as they will be
developed in the orderly course of case-by-case determinations.
Increased damages resulting from the overcompensation scheme
may chill the competition from unpatented products or discourage the
actual exploitation of patented inventions. At the same time, if the
expectation of the JPO and MITI is correct, the increased damage
awards will contribute to the recovery of the Japanese economy. In
any event, both the JPO and MITI have taken all possible measures in
the field of technology and industry policy, there is nothing we can
do at this moment other than to leave the result to chance.
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